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To err is human, to forgive is divine.
Alexander Pope

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1991, a donor gave the sum of US$100 dollars to benefit
students at a struggling school in rural China, instructing Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company (Morgan Guaranty) to prepare a bank draft in Chinese yuan.'
Due to a clerical error, Morgan Guaranty neglected the decimal point in the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., 1965, University of
Chicago; LL.M., 1962, Northwestern University; LL.B., 1958, Taiwan University. I am
deeply grateful to Piero Tozzi, Esq., J.D., 1996, Fordham Law School, for his assistance in

editing the drafts and the footnotes as well as for his valuable suggestions. I also would like
to thank Professor Joseph Perillo of Fordham Law School for his reading of the final draft and
his comments. All errors are mine.
** C Yung Frank Chiang

1. Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Pupils' Good Fortune Is Multiplied, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
29, 1991, at Al. The yuan is the basic Chinese currency denomination.
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exchange rate and instead remitted an amount in Chinese yuan equivalent to
U.S.$10,000.2 The payee, an elementary school, which received the draft
and the payment as a gift, was lucky because Morgan Guaranty decided to
donate the overpayment of U.S.$9900.3 Other receivers of such windfalls,
however, may not be so lucky. Had Morgan Guaranty decided to recover the
overpayment made by mistake, it would have had ample legal ground to do
so under both U.S. law 4 and Chinese law.'
If a store delivers merchandise ordered by B to A's house by mistake,
there is no doubt that the store may recover the merchandise from A.6 The
rule is the same where money, instead of merchandise, is misdelivered or
where a debtor pays money to his or her creditor in an amount greater than
the debtor actually owes.7 At common law, the law of restitution governs
as to whether a payer may recover a payment made by mistake. The law on
recovery of payment made by mistake may also be important where matters
are covered by statutes. For instance, Official Comments to Section 3-4188
of the pre-revision 1962 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Article 3
(Commercial Paper) indicate that the section relates to the rules of recovery
of payment or acceptance by mistake.9 However, the Ninth Circuit Court

2. Id.
3. Id.

4. The Restatement of Restitution provides:
A person who has paid another an excessive amount of money because of an
erroneous belief induced by a mistake of fact that the sum paid was necessary for
the discharge of a duty, for the performance of a condition, or for the acceptance
of an offer, is entitled to restitution of the excess.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 20 (1936).
5. Article 92 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China
provides: "Where improper benefit is obtained without lawful grounds, resulting in loss to
another party, the improper benefit obtained must be returned to the person who suffered the
loss." General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 92, translated
in 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 734 (Whitmore Gray & Henry Ruiheng Zheng trans., 1986). The
General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated in 1986,
effective January 1, 1987. Id. at 715.
6. See R.E. Jones Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd., [1926] A.C. 670, 696 (P.C.) (Eng.);
infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 262 & 508-10.
8. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1962) ("Finality of Payment or Acceptance") provides:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article on Bank Deposits
and Collections (Article 4) and except for liability for breach of warranty on
presentment under the preceding section, payment or acceptance of any instrument
is final in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith
changed his position in reliance on the payment.
Id.

9. See U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt.2 (1962) ("The section follows decisions under the original
Act applying the rule of Price v. Neal to the payment of overdrafts, or any other payment
made in error as to the state of the drawer's account"). The provisions of the 1990 Revised
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5
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of Appeals in Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 10 an action to recover payment of two notes made by mistake, held
in a two-to-one decision that Section 3-418 of the U.C.C. did not apply to the
case," and concluded that the payor bank was entitled to restitution under
New York law.' 2 The court defined "New York Law" to mean New York
common law. 13 The 1990 Revised Article 3 (Negotiable Instruments),
intending "to modernize, reorganize and clarify the law,"'14 incorporated, by
reference, the rules of recovery at common law in Section 3-418.' Thus,
it is essential to ascertain what the common law of restitution on the subject
is both under the pre-revision Article 3 and the Revised Article 3. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "In order to know what [the law] is, we
must know what it has been, and what it tends to become."' 6 Since U.S.
common law originated in England, it is important to review the common
law of restitution in English law.
In 1937, Lord Justice Scott, sitting in the Court of Appeal, commented,
"[T]he final demarcation of the boundaries of the old action of money had
and received has not yet been achieved, and that their final delineation can
be worked out only as concrete cases arise and bring up new points for
decision."' 7 However, English authorities now say, "Where money is paid
voluntarily under a mistake on the payer's part as to a material fact, as
general rule it may be recovered in an action for money had and received to
the plaintiff's use."'" In 1979, the Court of Queen's Bench, in Barclays

§ 3-418 make this point clear. See infra note 15.
10. 804 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1986). The payee, American Savings, was the holder of two
notes in the amount of US$5 million each, issued by Manville Corporation payable at Morgan
Guaranty. Id. at 1489.
11. Id. at 1496. I would concur with the dissenting judge that § 3-418 applies in this
case, but discussion of this is not within the scope of this article. See id. at 1501.
12. Id. at 1496, 1499-1500.
13. Id. at 1492.
14. See the prefatory note to the U.C.C. 1990 Revised Article 3.
15. The U.C.C. 1990 Revised art. 3, § 3-418 ("Payment or Acceptance by Mistake")
provides, in part:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), if an instrument has been paid or
accepted by mistake and the case is not covered by subsection (a), the person paying
or accepting may, to the extent permitted by the law governing mistake and
restitution, (i)recover the payment from the person to whom or for whose benefit
payment was made or (ii) in the case of acceptance, may revoke the acceptance.
U.C.C. § 3-418 (1990) (emphasis added).
16. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1951)
(1881).
17. Morgan v. Ashcroft, [1937] 3 All E.R. 92, 103 (C.A.) (Eng.). Money had and
received is the cause of action to recover payment made by mistake. See Moses v. Macferlan,
97 Eng. Rep. 676, 679-80 (K.B. 1760); infra text accompanying note 65.
18. See 32 HALSBURY'S LAW OF ENGLAND para. 63, at 38 (4th ed. 1980).
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Bank Ltd. v. W.J Simms Son & Cooke, Ltd., 9 also stated, "If a person pays
money to another under a mistake of fact which causes him to make the
payment, he is prima facie entitled to recover it as money paid under a
mistake of fact."2 As this article will show, the statement over simplifies
the rules of recovery on mistake in English law. The court also announced
some principles on law of recovery, which, the author of this article believes,
are not consistent with precedents. 2'
Historically, there are two theories underlying the rules applied by
English courts for granting recovery in such cases. One is the theory of
natural justice and equity. The second is the theory of imputed promise.
This article, by analyzing a line of English cases granting recovery of
payment by mistake under the theory of imputed promise, deduces some
general rules of recovery, which may be relevant to U.S. courts interpreting
common law.
Since mistake is a broad subject, some limitations must be set forth to
delineate the scope of this article. The first limitation is that payment must
be made by a person due to mistake of a fact. The mistake may be in a
matter of law or in a matter of fact. This article will deal only with mistake
in matters of fact, and not with mistake in matters of law.22 The mistake
of fact as discussed in this article refers to the state of mind of the payer,
who, at the time of payment, is erroneous as to the existence of a fact, past
or presence, whether such mistake was caused by ignorance on the part of the
payer, by forgotten knowledge,2 3 or by fraud of another person. Where the
mistake was caused by fraud on the part of the payee or a third person, this
article will discuss the case if the payer, in an action to recover the payment,
based the action on mistake,24 but not if the payer based the action on fraud.
In English law, negligence is in general not an issue in an action to recover
payment made by mistake.25
The second limitation is that this article will not deal with payment on
negotiable instruments which will discharge the debt on the negotiable
instruments. Due to the characteristics of negotiable instruments, they are
subject to some special rules of recovery, in addition to the general rules.

19. [1979] 3 All E.R. 522 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
20. Id. at 535; see discussion infra part IV.
21. See infra part IV for further discussion.
22. Judge Buller in Lowry v. Bourdieu, 99 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (1780), stated, "If the law
was mistaken, the rule applies, that ignorantia juris non excusat." The case was cited by
Bilbie v. Lumley, 102 Eng. Rep. 448, 450 (1802).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 332-38.
24. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676, is such a case.

25. See infra text accompanying notes 135 & 498.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5
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Because of its length, this article excludes discussion of such cases.26
Part I discusses the rule of recovery based on natural justice. The New
York law of restitution, as applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Morgan Guaranty," is in accord with the earlier English rule, which has
long been discarded by English courts. Part II discusses the rules of recovery
developed by English courts founded upon the theory of imputed promise.
It discusses three situations under which the law imputes a promise to refund
the payment, as well as exceptions under which the law will not impute such
promise. It then goes on to discuss the situations where the law imputes a
promise to pay, what the defenses of the payee are. Part Ill discusses the
English case, WJ. Simms, in which the court announced some principles of
law on the recovery of payment made by mistake.28 This article concludes
that some of the general principles of law that the English court deduced are
not supported by precedents.

II. THE THEORY OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND EQUITY
Since English law began with remedies, chiefly the forms of action,29
a brief review of the forms of action available for recovery of payment made
by mistake is necessary before discussing the substantive law. Each form of
action has its peculiar requirements. If the circumstances on which a claim
is based do not meet the requirements of an action, no right of recovery
exists.3" A person who paid money to another person by mistake would
have difficulty recovering in an action of trespass,31 debt,32 or detinue 3
26. An exception is the discussion of Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), and
Wi. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 522, in which the courts applied or discussed the general
rules.
27. American Sav., 804 F.2d at 1492-94.
28. W.J. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 535-36.
29. R.M. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW 3 (1986).
Jackson writes, "It is a commonplace that remedies, chiefly the forms of action, have moulded
our law. For centuries lawyers have been accustomed to consider not general theories but
forms of remedies." Justice Holmes likewise said, "[U]ntil lately, the substantive law has
been approached only through the categories of the forms of action." HOLMES, supra note 16,

at 78.
30. Discussing several forms of action for the recovery of money paid by mistake, Jackson
said, "The conclusion is that prior to the close of the sixteenth century our law allowed the
fortunate recipient to keep such money." JACKSON, supra note 29, at 7; see WILLIAM F.
WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 335-51 (2d ed. 1932) (discussing forms of
action).
31. In English law, actions may be defined as in personam, in rem, or mixed. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 28-29, 791, 793 (6th ed. 1990). The first form of action in personam is
trespass, an action in tort. See HOLMES, supra note 16, at 3. An action in trespass was based
on direct force or contact inflicted by the defendant. See id. Justice Holmes stated, "Any
wrongful and direct application of force is redressed by th[e] action [of trespass]." Id. at 80;
see also Dickenson v. Watson, 84 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1682); Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng.
Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616); JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 41-46 (1913);

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. I I

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5

The action of account came into use at about the same time as the action

of debt.34 It is an action originally created "to compel restitution of money
entrusted [by one person to] another to be applied in a specified way; and if
not so applied, the court [gives] judgment that the payer recover[s] the
money [from the payee]."35 It was in an action of account that a payer was
first permitted to recover the payment made by mistake.36 The action of
assumpsit is said to have been created in 1520.37 But the action was based
on a promise to pay. Where there was a contract, which consisted of a
promise to pay, either express or implied, the action would lie. 38 But, in
most cases where a payer sued to recover payment made by mistake, no
promise by the payee to pay existed.

JACKSON, supra note 29, at 6-7, 8 (stating that "[i]f the goods came to the possession of the
defendant by consent of the plaintiff, or of plaintiff's bailee, trespass would not lie").
32. In an action of debt, the plaintiff alleges and proves that a definite sum of money is
due to him from the defendant. See WALSH, supra note 30, at 338-39. The plaintiff sues for
the money due as his property; he does not sue on a promise. Id. at 338. Hence, the action
of debt was not necessarily based upon the existence of a contract. It was first used "to
recover a loan of money; later it came into use to recover the purchase-price of goods sold."
Id. Subsequently the action of debt was used "to recover rent due under a lease, money due
from a surety, and a fixed sum due under a sealed instrument." Id. at 338-39. In addition,
it was used to recover sums due "for customary dues, penalties for breaches of by-laws, and
the like." United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, [1940] 4 All E.R. 20, 35 (H.L.) (Eng.).
A plaintiff could base an action of debt on a contract, either express or implied, to recover the
money for a consideration which the defendant had received under the contract. Payment of
money by a payer by mistake usually does not create this kind of debt. So, an action of debt
would not lie. The defendant in an action of debt "could wage his law." Id.
33. The action of detinue slowly developed from the action of debt. WALSH, supra note
30, at 117. The action of detinue is for recovery of things that belong to the plaintiff. Id.
In the case of payment of money by mistake, the title to the money has passed to the
defendant. Id. at 119; JACKSON, supra note 29, at 7. Therefore, an action of detinue would
not lie for recovery of money paid by mistake.
34. WALSH, supra note 30, at 348.
35. Id.
36. Hewer v. Bartholomew, 78 Eng. Rep. 855, 855-56 (Q.B. 1598). For further
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 56-64. Three years earlier, the court of Queen's
Bench had stated in dictum that an action of account would lie in such a case. Framson v.
Delamere, 78 Eng. Rep. 711, 712 (Q.B. 1595); see also Sinclair v. Brougham, 111 L.T.R. 1,
17 (C.A.) (H.L. 1914); WALSH, supra note 30, at 348-49.
37. AMES, supra note 31, at 142-43; see also JACKSON, supra note 29, at 4 & n.2 ("It was
...decided, in 1520, that one who sold goods to a third person on the faith of the defendant's
promise that the price should be paid, might have an action on the case upon the promise.").
In 1615, an action of assumpsit made purely executory bilateral contracts enforceable
where debt or covenant would not lie. WALSH, supra note 30, at 344-45. However, a payor
who claimed to recover the money paid by mistake could not sue in an action of assumpsit
because usually there was no promise by the defendant to repay. Id. at 341-50 (discussing the
action of assumpsit).
38. In Cox v. Prentice, 105 Eng. Rep. 641 (K.B. 1815), which involved an action in
assumpsit for money had and received, the plaintiff, who had bought from the defendant a bar
of silver said to contain four ounces, sued to recover the payment on the ground of mistake
when the bar in fact contained only two ounces. Id. The court allowed recovery. Id. at 643.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5
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The action of indebitatusassumpsit was created later and was concurrent
with the action of debt.3 9 In 1760, the court in Moses v. Macferlan" for
the first time permitted a payer who reclaimed payment made by mistake to
bring an action of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received where
no contract existed.41 After that case, most actions to recover payment
made by mistake were brought in the action of indebitatus assumpsit under
the cause of action of money had and received until 1852, when the Common
Law Procedure Act was enacted. 42 However, money had and received for
plaintiff's use as a cause of action is not only for money paid in mistake of
fact, but also for money paid for a consideration that has failed; money paid
because it was extorted colore officii or by duress and in cases where the
plaintiff has had an actionable wrong, for example, where the plaintiff sues
in assumpsit, not tort, based on the defendant's fraud even though the
plaintiff has not yet paid any money to the defendant.43
In England, an action to recover payment for money had and received on
the ground of mistake is within the jurisdiction of the court of law.
Chancery, the equity court, never dealt with such action unless the plaintiff
based the action on the fraud on the part of the defendant 4 or unless the
plaintiff, in an insolvency case, requested the court to distribute assets among

39. See AMES, supra note 31, at 145 (stating, "Slade's Case, [76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.
1603),] decided in 1603, is commonly thought to be the source of this action. But this is a
misapprehension. Indebitatus assumpsit upon an express promise is at least sixty years older
than Slade's Case."). However, the term "indebitatus assumpsit" was not yet in use at the
time of Slade's Case. In Bonnel v. Foulke, 82 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1657), an action in
assumpsit (action on the case on assumpsit) in the Court of Superior Banco for the recovery
of rent wrongfully paid, the plaintiff's attorney claimed that it was for "indebitatusassumpsit."
The jury found for the plaintiff. Bonnel, 82 Eng. Rep. at 1224.
In Case 122, Anonymus, 88 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1673), an indebitatus assumpsit count
was formally used. In that case the plaintiff brought the action of indebitatus assumpsit,
which was an action on the case, instead of an action of debt, for the recovery of the price
of goods sold to the defendant. Id. The court of King's Bench allowed the recovery. Id.
By the end of the seventeenth century, indebitatus assumpsit could be used to recover
payment induced by fraud. JACKSON, supra note 29, at 9; see also WALSH, supra note 30,
at 345, 348.
40. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
41. Id. at 681. The concept of money had and received as a cause of action was
expressed in Martin v. Sitwell, 89 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1690). See infra text accompanying
notes 87-90 for a discussion of the case.
42. Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbaim Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., [1942] 2 All E.R.
122, 137 (Eng.) (citations omitted) (stating that under the Act, it was no longer necessary for
plaintiffs to specify the particular form of action under which they sued. In addition, plaintiffs
were able to omit statements of promises in indebitatus counts that did not have to be proved.
Thus, by 1868, the action of indebitatus assumpsit had become virtually obsolete).
43. Morgan v. Ashcroft, [1937] 3 All E.R. 92, 105 (Eng.).
44. See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 7 (stating that he does "not know of any case where
the chancellor was asked to give a remedy, except where the plaintiffs mistake was due to
fraud in the defendant").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

7

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. I11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5

claimants.45 However, the term "equity" as used in this article means
natural justice, not the laws applied by chancellors and the subsequent equity
46

courts.

The earliest English case found on record that involved payment by
mistake is Framson v. Delamere,47 decided in 1595. Adderley sued Malyns
in the Compter of London,48 and then Malyns was arrested and
imprisoned. 49 Framson, upon the request of Delamere, paid bail for Malyns
with Delamere agreeing to indemnify Framson.5 ° Adderley obtained a
judgment against Malyns; Framson was then ordered to pay, and he did.5'
It then appeared that Framson had paid by mistake, since Adderley's name
was spelled "Adderbye" in the judgment, and Framson was only bound to
pay "Adderley., 52 In the action of assumpsit by Framson against Delamere
for indemnification, the Court of Queen's Bench 3 held that the plaintiff
could not recover because the defendant agreed to indemnify the plaintiff if
he paid the judgment on behalf of Malyns in the action by Adderley against
Malyns considering that the plaintiff actually had paid in the action by
"Adderbye." 54 The Court then stated that the plaintiff had an action of
5
account against Adderley to recover the sum he had paid.
Although the word "mistake" was not used in the report, that Framson
made a mistake in paying the judgment is clear. Since the case is not one
in which a payor (Framson) sued the person who received the money
(Adderley) in order to recover the money, the statement of theFramson court
that the plaintiff may recover from Adderley in an action of account is
merely a dictum. Perhaps that is why the court did not elaborate on the rule
of recovery from the person who received money.
Three years later, the court of Queen's Bench was presented with a case
in which a payer brought an action in account for the recovery of payment

45. See Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 7-8. The case was brought to the Chancery Division of
the High Court of Justice. Id.
46. See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 5 n.2 (stating that "[e]quity did not become in
substance a body of rules until the later seventeenth century, when the use of precedents
became usual in chancery").
47. 78 Eng. Rep. 711 (Q.B. 1595). This writer cannot find any case prior to Framson in
which a payer was allowed to recover money on the ground of mistake in an action of account
or other actions.
48. The Compter of London was the Sheriff's Court. Framson, 78 Eng. Rep. at 712.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Prior to the Judicature Act of 1873, the Court of Queen's or King's Bench was the
supreme court of common law in England. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at
870-71.
54. Framson, 78 Eng. Rep. at 712.
55. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5
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by mistake against the payee. In Hewer v. Bartholomew,16 Bartholomew
paid Hewer £100 in redemption of a mortgage, demanding certain evidences
and bonds in return.57 Hewer refused to give them to Bartholomew.'8
Bartholomew then demanded the return of the money, and Hewer gave it
back to him. 9 Subsequently realizing that it was a mistake to return the
money, Hewer brought the action of account to recover the money.60 In
granting the recovery of money paid, the court said that the money paid to
Bartholomew was Hewer's. 6' Additionally, while Hewer had given the
money to Bartholomew, this was not a payment, and Hewer received no
consideration from Bartholomew.62 Given these factors, Bartholomew is
liable to Hewer for the money he had received from Hewer. The word
"mistake" was not mentioned in the case, but it is clear that it was a case of
payment by mistake. The court stated that the plaintiff did not give the
'
Thus, the holding of the case is that
money "upon [any] consideration."63
a person who delivers money to another, while supposing that the money
belonged to the latter, without receiving a consideration may recover the
money from the latter on the ground of mistake.' The court did not cite
any case and did not mention any theory to support the holding.
A little more than one hundred and sixty years later, in 1760, the Moses
Court granted the recovery of money in an action of indebitatus assumpsit
for money had and received.65 In so doing, the court relied on a theory of
natural justice and equity. The case was tried before the great commercial
law judge, Lord Mansfield. 66 Moses had endorsed to Macferlan four

56. 78 Eng. Rep. 855 (Q.B. 1598).
57. Id. at 856.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (stating that the "payment [by Bartholomew] was a good discharge of the
mortgage; and although [Bartholomew] afterwards required it again, as his own money, yet
it shall not avoid that which was absolutely paid; but the mortgage remains absolutely
discharged; and the monies [delivered by Hewer] were [Hewer's] own monies").
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 855.
65. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 678. Commenting on Moses and the evolution of the action
of indebitatus assumpsit, Haldane in Sinclair stated, "The basis of actions of... [indebitatus
assumpsit] was originally tort .... By degrees, out of this action... the action of assumpsit
arose . . . . Then came the extension of indebitatus assumpsit to cases in which . ..no
express promise could be proved. For ...the law is ready to imply a debt in such cases
arising quasi ex contractu. The promise to pay which created the right of action might have
been a pure fiction of law. In many cases no such promise could possibly have been
established. Yet it took some time before the judges brought themselves to go so far."
Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 5.
66. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676.
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promissory notes for thirty shillings each, made by Jacob.67 The notes were
made to Moses, and Moses endorsed them to allow Macferlan to recover the
money in his own name from Jacob.6 8 Prior to Moses' endorsing the notes,
Macferlan had signed an indemnity agreement, assuring Moses that he would
not hold Moses liable for the payment of any money resulting from his
endorsement.69
Nonetheless, Macferlan brought four separate actions against Moses in
the Court of Conscience ° on the four notes.7' In the first, the court
pronounced a decree giving judgment against Moses on his endorsement.72
Finding a lack of authority to judge it, the court refused to hear any evidence
proving the existence of the indemnity agreement.73 But Moses' agent paid
the money on behalf of Moses on all four notes, including three notes on
which no judgment had been entered, most likely believing that Moses also
was liable for them.74 Subsequently, Moses brought the action in King's
Bench Court to recover the money from Macferlan. 75 The jury rendered a
verdict for Moses for the amount that he had paid.76 This was subject to
the opinion of the court upon the propriety of the form of action, specifically
whether an action to recover money paid had to be on an agreement or could
be, as in this case, in an action upon the case in the form of indebitatus
assumpsit for money had and received.77 Mansfield, in delivering the
unanimous opinion of the court, held that the action on the case of
indebitatus assumpsit would lie for the recovery of money paid. 8
The statement of the court "that [the endorsement] was done, in order to
enable the now defendant Macferlan to recover the money in his own name

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Such courts were constituted by acts of Parliament in the City of London and other
towns for the recovery of small debts. They were not courts of record and were more
commonly called Courts of Request. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 356,
362. The judges of such courts were called commissioners.
71. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 676-77.
75. Id. at 676'
76. Id.
77. Id. at 677. In an action on a contract, the plaintiff may recover the cost and expenses
incurred by the plaintiff, in addition to money received by the defendant. In order to do so,
however, the plaintiff has to state and prove the special circumstances from which he
concludes that in justice and equity the money received by the defendant ought to be deemed
as belonging to him. On the other hand, in an action of assumpsit in a case for money had
and received, the plaintiff may recover only the money received by the defendant, however,
to establish that such is the case, he need only declare "that the money was received to his
use." Id. at 679.

78. Id. at 678.
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against [the maker]" 7 9 and Macferlan's signing of an indemnity agreement
indicate that Moses received no consideration for his endorsement, although
the report did not expressly say so. It is not clear, then, why lack of
consideration was not a defense to the action on the endorsement in the Court
of Conscience. A possible explanation is that the small claim court had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of consideration as well as the indemnity
agreement.8 0
Three aspects of Moses made it a landmark case. The first one is on the
form of action. Up until Moses, an action to recover money paid by mistake
was brought in an action of account. 8 The Mansfield court for the first
time permitted an action to recover money in the action of indebitatus
assumpsit where no contract, either express or implied, existed. 2 In
answering the defendant's objection that "no assumpsit lies, except upon an
express or implied contract: but here it is impossible to presume any contract83
to refund money, which the defendant recovered by an adverse suit,'
Mansfield replied, "If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of
naturaljustices, to refund[,] the law implies a debt, and gives this action,...
as it were upon a contract ('quasi ex contractu,' as the Roman law expresses
it)."'
The plaintiff can waive the indemnity agreement and bring suit to
recover the money iniquitously retained by the defendant.8" He added,
[The action] lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration
which happens to fail; or for money got through imposition,(express,
or implied;) or extortion; or oppression; or an undue advantage taken
of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to laws made for the protection
of persons under those circumstances.8 6
Thus, the Mansfield court concluded that an action in indebitatus assumpsit
would lie even though no contract existed.
The second aspect in which the case became a landmark case is on the
cause of action. The cause of action in Moses is money had and received for
the plaintiff's use. In English law, until the creation of the cause of action

79. Id. at 676.
80. Mansfield stated, "It is enough for us, that the commissioners adjudged 'they had no
cognizance of such collateral matter.'" Id. at 678-79.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 56-64.
82. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 678.
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added). For the influence of Roman law on English common law, see
Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 447
(1961).
85. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 681.
86. Id.
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of money had and received, actions in personam were divided into actions
in tort and actions in contract. In various forms of action in contract, there
must be an actual contract, express or implied. When the cause of action of
money had and received was first created, the case had to involve a contract
or a promise and the action for recovery was indebitatus assumpsit. In
Martin v. Sitwell,87 decided in 1690, a shipper of goods brought an action
of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received to recover an insurance
premium which his agent had paid to an insurer for coverage of the goods
to be put on board of a ship but which the agent never put on board.88 To
the insurer's contention that it should have been a special action of the case
upon "the custom of merchants, ' 8 9 Chief Justice Holt, holding for the
plaintiff, replied, "The money is not only to be returned by the custom, but
the policy is made originally void, the party for whose use it was made
having no goods on board; so that by this discovery the money was received
without any reason, occasion, or consideration, and consequently it was
originally received to the plaintiff's use." 90 Holt, in Palmer v. Stavely,9'
an action in indebitatus assumpsit for money received for the plaintiff's use,
again said, "In debt one never lays a promise, but only debt; but in assumpsit
there is a contract in law to pay what you received to another's use .... So
it will not be enough to say, that the defendant being indebted to you in so
much money, he promised to pay you . ...,92 Thus, up until Moses,
money had and received as a cause of action had been for the return of
payment made under a contract. 93 In Moses, the plaintiff sued for money
had and received to recover money where the defendant was not under actual
contract, express or implied, to repay.94 The claim to recover money was
based on what one must in justice return, 95 or as subsequent courts, based

87. 89 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1690).
88. There was no mistake of fact in this case because the agent understood that the goods
were to be loaded after he had paid. Id.
89. The custom of merchants was that when the money was paid as premium, it would
be returned upon matter happening ex post facto. Id. at 510. "Debt was the proper form of

action to enforce the payment of money due by custom or by statute."

WALSH,

supra note

30, at 348.
90. Martin, 89 Eng. Rep. at 510 (emphasis added).
91. 88 Eng. Rep. 1483 (K.B. 1700).
92. Id. at 1484.
93. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676. An exception where payment returned was not made
under a contract was Newdigate v. Davy, 91 Eng. Rep. 1397 (K.B. 1692). In that case, a
payer sued in indebitatus assumpsitfor money paid to recover money paid under the sentence
of a court that had no jurisdiction "as [money] received to his use." Id. The court of King's
Bench allowed recovery. Id. The court probably treated a void judgement as analogous to
a void contract because the payer would be under an obligation to pay if the judgment were

valid.

94. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676.

95. Id. at 681.
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on the theory of imputed promise, stated, "in the eye of the law, the
defendant is liable to repay to the plaintiff. ' 96 From Moses on, the cause
of action of money had and received also has been used in cases where no
contract, express or implied, was involved.
In an analysis that provides an excellent example of how common law
actions evolved, Mansfield in Moses first held that where an action would lie
on an agreement, the plaintiff could sue on the equity of the agreement rather
than on the agreement in the action of indebitatus assumpsit.97 Mansfield
made a second twist by holding that money had and received could be the
cause of action in a situation where no actual contract, express or implied,
existed. 98 He concluded by stating that the action for money had and
received is equitable action for money that the defendant ought to refund to
the plaintiff.9 9 This action does not arise where the plaintiff pays the
defendant to satisfy a claim that the defendant cannot enforce in court due
to the plaintiff's statutory defense. Thus, Mansfield indicates that money had
and received as a cause of action belongs to a third class, distinct both from
a contract action and a tort action, though it resembles a contract action
rather than a tort action."° Hence, the action was subsequently calledsimilar to the Roman law expression - quasi contractual in nature.
The third aspect in which Moses became a landmark case is in the area
of substantive law. The court announced a rule of law that includes the
concept of natural justice as its element.' 0 ' By approving the form of
action, the court of King's Bench also approved the substantive law upon
which the jury rendered the verdict for the plaintiff. The report did not
mention the rule of law instructed to and applied by the jury. The court
simply said, "There was no doubt at the trial, but that upon the merits the
plaintiff was entitled to the money."'0 2 The verdict of the jury in Moses
was undoubtedly based on the equity arising out of the indemnity agreement,
in which Macferlan promised not to hold Moses liable for the endorsement.' 3' Mansfield said, "The ground of this action is ... that the

96. Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 95.
97. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 679; see supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
98. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 680.
99. Id. at 680-81 (emphasis added).
100. "[T]he English law having no quasi contract, got over the difficulty in such cases as
the action for money had and received by the fiction of a contract." Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at
11; see also Fibrosa, [1942] 2 All E.R. at 136.
101. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 678.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 679. As Lord Mansfield expounded:
[If one admits] ...that an action might be brought upon the agreement,. ..[then
there should not be] any objection from the judgment. For it is the same thing, as
to the force and validity of the judgment.... whether the plaintiff brings it upon
the equity of his case arising out of the agreement ...or upon the agreement itself.
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defendant ought not in justice [be allowed] to keep the money."' In
answering an objection to the action on the ground that where money had
been recovered by the judgment of a court having competent jurisdiction, the
matter could never be brought over again by a new action, Mansfield
responded that even when money is recovered by a legal judgment, iniquities
still may exist in keeping that money."' There may be a ground which the
payer cannot use as a defence against the judgment.'0 6 For example, the
endorsee of a promissory note recovers payment from both the drawer and
the endorser who was unaware of the drawer's payment. 0 7
Thus, undoubtedly the court's decision on the substantive issue was based
on natural justice and equity. The court came up with the concept of implied
debt merely to justify the form of action under which the plaintiff brought
the action. Although Mansfield stated that the defendant had obtained the
endorsement by fraud,"0 8 the plaintiff did not allege this, and the court did
not base its judgment directly on fraud. As discussed earlier, the holding was
based on the equity arising out of the indemnity agreement.
The Mansfield court announced a broad rule: the payer is entitled to the
return of money if the payee cannot in justice keep it. Mansfield stated that
the action for money had and received "lies for money paid by mistake."' '
It may be argued that the case did not involve a mistake of fact and, thus, the
statement is at best a dictum. Such argument may be true with respect to the
payment of money pursuant to the judgment of the Court of Conscience on
one note, but not with respect to the payments for the other three notes which
Moses paid in the absence of judgments and which Moses paid by mistake.
Moses mistakenly believed that he was obliged to pay the other three notes
on his endorsement. In any event, the rule announced by the Court is broad
enough to encompass money paid by mistake. Mansfield mentioned two
examples involving mistake where the payer was entitled to the return of
money. One was that a man was entitled to recover money paid upon a
policy for a ship presumed to be lost, which afterwards came home; the other
was that a man was entitled to recover money paid upon a policy on the life
of a man presumed to be dead, who afterwards appeared. These examples
involve payment of money by mistake. Therefore, recovery of payment

Id.
104. Id. (citation omitted in original).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 680 (stating, "The notion of fraud holds much more strongly in the present case,
than in [Dutch v. Warren]: for here it is express. The [e]ndorsement, which enabled
[Macferlan] to recover, was got by fraud and falsehood, for one purpose, and abused to
another.").
109. Id. at 681.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5
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made by mistake is within the parameter of the rule announced by Mansfield.
A subsequent court of King's Bench confirmed in Towers v. Barrett"° such
a broad rule when it said, "[lit was held in Moses and Macferlan that an
money paid by mistake,
action for money had and received will lie to recover
H
or upon a consideration which happens to fail."'
In Hewer, the court did not announce the substantive rule which it
applied, let alone the theory on which the rule was founded." 2 In Sinclair
v. Brougham,"3 Lord Dunedin stated that "where a shopkeeper delivered
an article ordered by B. by mistake to the house of A.," a situation similar
to that in Hewer, "all ideas of natural justice are against allowing A. to keep
the property of B., which has somehow got into A.,'s possession without any
intention on the part of B. to make a gift to A.""' 4 Thus, the holding of
Hewer was consistent with natural justice and Moses is consistent with
Hewer. William Blackstone, who taught English Law at Oxford University,
also advocated natural law as the foundation of law around the same time
Moses was decided." 5
The broad rule announced in Moses was applied again by Mansfield in
Buller v. Harrison."6 In this case, the plaintiff had insured a ship for a
voyage. The defendant, an agent of the insured, sent a notice of the loss to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff, thinking the loss was fair, paid the sum of £2100
to the defendant. The defendant passed the whole sum in his account with
the insured, and gave credit to them for it against a sum of £3000, in which
they stood indebted to him. Subsequently, it was uncovered that the loss was
wrongful, and the plaintiff had mistakenly paid. The cause of action was
money had and received. The question before the Mansfield court was
whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the money from the defendant.
Mansfield, holding for the plaintiff, stated that in this case "there was no new
credit, no acceptance of new bills, no fresh goods bought or money
advance."' "1 7 He reasoned that in good conscience the defendant should not
keep money that he has received by misrepresentation and on which he has
no legal claim."' Thus, Mansfield spoke of the payee's defense in terms
of retaining the money in good conscience." 9
110. 99 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1786).
111. Id. at 1015.
112. Hewer, 78 Eng. Rep. at 855.
113. 111 L.T.R. 1 (H.L. 1914) (Eng.).
114. Id. at 10.
115. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41 (1765) (stating that "no human laws
are of any validity, if contrary to [the law of nature]"). Blackstone was appointed as the first
Professor of English Law in 1758.
116. 98 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1777).
117. Id. at 1244-45.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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In Moses, Mansfield said that "the defendant, upon the circumstances of
the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money."' 2 ° Although, he also said, "[A payee] may retain it with a safe
conscience,"'' undoubtedly, the rule announced by him is an objective
rule."2 In other words, the terms "safe conscience" or "injustice" as an
element of the rule must be judged objectively by courts, rather than
subjectively by the payee.
In Hewer and Moses, the payers received no consideration when they
made their payments. But, under Mansfield's rule, even though a payer has
received no consideration for the payment, the payee may in justice retain the
payment. Where the payee had given a bonafide consideration for a forged
bill of exchange, the payer of the bill was not entitled to recover the
payment. In the landmark case of Price v. Neal,123 Lee, signing under the
fictitious name of Benjamin Sutton, drew two bills of exchange, each in the
amount of forty pounds, on John Price; they were both payable to "Mr.
Roger Ruding or order."' 124 The first bill of exchange was endorsed by
Ruding to Neal for a valuable consideration.1 21 When the bill came due,
Price paid the amount to Neal without suspicion as to the genuineness of the
signature of Sutton.1 26 Upon discovery of the forgery, Price brought the
action against Neal to recover the payment.1 27 The form of action was
action upon the case. 28 The cause of action was for money had and
30
received.129 The court noted that defendant had committed no fraud.
Although the court's opinion did not mention the word "mistake," 3 that it is
a case of mistake can be seen from the argument for the plaintiff.1'
32
The court, in a unanimous opinion, denied recovery by the plaintiff.
The basis of the denial of recovery was not simply that the payer, or drawee,
had made a mistake. On the contrary, mistake, along with fraud or other

120. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 681.
121. Id.
122. Buller, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1245.
123. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). Although this article deals only with the general rules
of recovery, not with payment on a negotiable instrument, I discuss this particular case in
order to illustrate that the general rule of recovery based on natural justice also applied to
payment on negotiable instruments.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 872.
131. "Mr. Stowe, for the plaintiff, argued that he ought to recover back the money, in this
action; as it was paid by him by mistake only, on supposition 'that these were true genuine
bills ....1 .Id. at 871. Neither the defendant nor the court disputed this statement.
132. Id. at 872.
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causes, was a ground for the cause of action of money had and received to
recover the payment as indicated in Hewer and Moses. 33 Two statements
made by Mansfield in Price were discussed by a judge in a subsequent case,
Smith v. Mercer,"3 as possible grounds for denial of recovery. One was
that the payer was negligent. 135 The other was that the drawee had duty
to make sure that the signature of the drawer was genuine. 136 Judge Dallas
in Smith said, "Price ...furnishes a rule which ought to govern the present
[case] .... [T]he Defendant was adjudged to retain as to both [bills], and,
as it seems, partly on [the] ground[] of neglect in the Plaintiff.' ' 37 He then
said, "[D]ue caution would have prevented such payment. If an acceptor
[drawer] is... bound to know the drawer's hand-writing, is it less the duty
of a banker to know the hand-writing of his customer? In degree, it is more
so . ... '138 But, neither statement of Mansfield's was part of the rule
applied in Price. Although Mansfield said, "If there was no neglect in the
plaintiff, yet there is no reason to throw off the loss from one innocent man
upon another innocent man,' 139 he did not say that negligence on the part
of the payer (the plaintiff) was the ground of denial of recovery. This point
was further confirmed in London & Riverplate Bank v. Bank of Liverpool. 4° In commenting on Price, the court stated: "It was not said in
[Price] . ..that there had been negligence, nor was it said that if there had
been no negligence the action would lie." 14' Furthermore, the court queried
that "[i]f the forgery were cleverly executed,. . . how is [it] possible that the
acceptor should know it was a forgery ....[I]t [is] extraordinary that the
right of the acceptor to recover the money paid to the holder ... depend[s]
upon whether or not the forgery was cleverly executed."' 42
Although Mansfield said that it was the drawee's duty to know his
drawer's signature,4 3 that is not the basis of the judgment either. As the
court in National Westminster Bank v. Barclays Bank International'" said,

133. If there is no mistake of fact in making a payment, no recovery of the payment will
be granted, unless other grounds of recovery, such as fraud, exist. Bilbie, 102 Eng. Rep. at
448; see also Harris v. Loyd, 151 Eng. Rep. 183 (Q.B. 1839).
134. 128 Eng. Rep. 961 (K.B. 1815).

135. Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 872 (stating that "if there was any fault or negligence in any
one, it certainly was in the plaintiff and not in the defendant").
136. Id. ("It was incumbent upon the plaintiff, to be satisfied 'that the bill drawn upon him
was the drawer's hand,' before he accepted or paid it.").
137. Smith, 128 Eng. Rep. at 963 (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 872.
140. [1895] All E.R. 1005 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
141. Id. at 1007.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying note 136.
144. [1974] 3 All E.R. 834 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
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"The common aphorism that a banker is under a duty to know his customer's
signature4 5 is in fact incorrect even as between the banker and his customer." 1
The issue for the Price court was whether the defendant might in justice
retain the money. Mansfield, speaking for the court, said that "great
liberality is always allowed, in this sort of action," and that basically, it is up
to the conscience of the person who has received the money whether to
return it."4 Thus, recovery was denied because "it can never be thought
unconscientious in the defendant to retain th[e] money when he has once
received it upon a bill of exchange [e]ndorsed to him for a fair and valuable
consideration, which he had bona fide paid, without the least privity or
suspicion of any forgery."' 147 It is an important element of the rule that in
Price, "[the payee], bonafide, paid a fair and valuable consideration" for the
14
instrument. 1
Thus, the ruling of Price is consistent with Moses. The difference
between the payer in Moses who was allowed to recover the money and the
payer in Price who was not is that in Moses the payee could not in
conscience keep the money, while in Price the payee could. Price was
decided under the general rule of restitution in accordance with Mansfield's
natural justice theory.
Likewise, if a drawee has first accepted a bill by mistake and then paid
a draft, it gives the payee an additional reason to keep the money. That is
the case of the second forged bill of exchange in Price. The second bill, also
drawn on Price and payable to "Mr. Rogers Ruding or order" by Lee under
the name of Sutton, was endorsed "R. Ruding" and presented to the drawee,
John Price, for acceptance. 49 Price, not knowing that the signature of
Sutton was forged, accepted the bill and ordered Freame and Barclay to pay
on their behalf.'
The bill so accepted was then endorsed to Neal for a
valuable consideration.' 51 Freame and Barclay paid the draft when it
became due by the order of Price.'52 In the action of Price, Price also sued
to recover the payment on the second bill on the ground of mistake. The
court, in denying the recovery, said, "The defendant, [Neal], had actual encouragement from the plaintiff himself, for negotiating the second bill, from
the plaintiff's having without any scruple or hesitation paid the first: and he

145.
146.
147.
148.
not yet
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 844.
Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 872.
Id.
Id. At the time of Price, the term "bona fide holder" or "holder in due course" had
come into use.
Id. at 871
Id.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 871.
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paid the whole value, bona fide. It is a misfortune which has happened
without the defendant's fault or neglect."' 3 The additional reason to deny
the recovery sounds like an estoppel. Yet under Mansfield's theory, it was
an additional reason for Neal to pay for the bill bona fide, justifying his
keeping the money. Thus, under the rule announced by Mansfield, the issue
is whether the payee may in justice keep the money. It must be pointed out
that by holding that the payer was not entitled to the return of money if the
payee could in justice keep it, the court did not say that the mistake had to
be between the payer and the payee or had to be mutual if it was between the
two in order for the payer to recover. Nor did the court say that for the
payee to keep the money, the equity of the payee to keep the money had to
outweigh the equity of the payer to recover.
The 1962 U.C.C. Official Comments to Section 3-418 states that the
section follows the rule of Price.I"4 In Morgan Guaranty, the court in
rejecting the application of Section 3-418 and in applying New York law,
found that "New York allows actions for unjust enrichment or money had
and received to recover money paid by mistake where it would be inequitable
for the payee to retain the money." ' 5 The New York rule, as described by
the court, is in accord with that of Price. Yet, the court, instead of asking
whether the payee could in justice keep the money, asked whether the payee
had the right to keep the money.5 6 Holding that American Savings was
not entitled to retain the money, the court reasoned that once the maker of
the notes had filed its petition in bankruptcy, American Savings had no right
to receive the payment. 7 The court noted that American Savings was
aware that it had no right to the payment when it received the money, and
did not consider the fact that the payee was a holder in due course. 58 In
Price, the payee, who had paid for the unaccepted forged bill of exchange,
had no right to the payment, if he sued on the bill. 9 Neither the drawer
whose name was forged, nor the drawee was obliged to pay the forged bills;
60
yet, the court allowed the payee to keep the money.'
The legal philosophy of the English courts during the eighteenth century,
which was based on natural justice, was not unique. It is interesting to note
that the period during which Mansfield advocated the theory of natural justice
and equity was contemporaneous with the era during which the natural law

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 872.
U.C.C. § 3-418 (1962); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Morgan, 804 F.2d at 1492; see supra text accompanying note 10-12.
Morgan, 804 F.2d at 1496.
Id.
Id. at 1495-98.
Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 872.
Id.
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theory flourished on the European continent.

III.

THE THEORY OF IMPUTED PROMISE OR QUASI CONTRACT

The theory of natural justice in English jurisprudence as expounded by
Mansfield did not last. In 1786, Mansfield still said, "I am a great friend to
the action for money had and received: it is a very beneficial action, and
founded on principles of eternal justice." 62 Only eleven years later, the
court in Marriot v. Hampton 63 rejected the natural justice theory.
Hampton had brought an action against Marriot for goods sold.164 Marriot
had already paid for the goods and obtained Hampton's receipt. 16 At the
time of Hampton's action, Marriot could not locate the receipt, and since he
had no proof of payment, he could not defend the action."x6 Consequently,
he had to pay the money again. 67 Later, Marriot located the receipt and
brought the action of money had and received for the return of his second
payment, citing Moses in support.'6t The court unanimously disallowed the
payer to recover. 16 9 Chief Judge Lord Kenyon, in delivering his opinion,
gave no other reason than saying, "If this action could be maintained I know
not what cause of action could ever be at rest. After a recovery by process
of law there must be an end of litigation, otherwise there would be no
security for any person."' 170 Judge Grose added, "It would tend to encourage the greatest negligence if we were to open a door to parties to try
their causes again because they were not properly prepared the first time with
their evidence.' 17' Neither judge cited any case to support his opinion.
Undoubtedly, the payer in Marriot, who was forced to pay twice,
received no consideration for his second payment to the payee, in the

161. "A whole series of codifications [in Europe] owed their origin to [the] rational systems
of natural law: that of Bavaria in 1756, that of Prussia, begun by Frederick the Great and
eventually promulgated in 1794, and that of Austria in 1811. The famous Prussian
Allgemeines Landrecht [fuer die preussischen staaten (the Common Regional Law of the
PrussianState),] ...the Code Napoleon of 1804 [and] the Birgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1896
... prescribe with mathematical precision what is right and what is wrong ....
" PETER
STEIN, LEGAL EVOLuTiON: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 52 (1980). For an argument that natural
law was the foundation of U.S. legal concepts as well, see FRANCIS P. LEBuFFE & JAMES V.
HAYES, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (5th ed. 1953). The cases cited to support its
argument were, however, decided after 1880.
162. Towers, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1015.
163. 101 Eng. Rep. 969 (K.B. 1797).

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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previous action brought by the payee. 1 2 But the court, disregarding Moses,
denied the recovery and created a rule that the payer who paid the money
through process of law cannot recover the payment even if the payer received
no consideration for the payment. 7 3 A subsequent court said that Marriot
was decided not on the ground of resjudicata,but "in the interests of public
policy that there should be an end to litigation after a recovery by process of
law."' 74 Although Marriot is not a case of mistake,'75 it is a landmark
case because money had and received is also the cause of action for recovery
of payment by mistake and it is the first case in which the English court
disregarded Mansfield's theory in such an action. Clearly, exigency, not
natural justice and equity, was in the minds of the court. The court was
more interested in ending a litigation than in administering justice. Lord
Sumner, in a subsequent case before the House of Lords, 7 6 cited Marriot
as a case that illustrated "that money [wa]s not thus recoverable77 in all cases
where it [wa]s unconscientious for the defendant to retain it.'
Marriot signified the beginning of a new era in English law. English
courts from then on began to develop laws of restitution for the recovery of
payment by mistake that do not contain natural justice as an element of a
positive law. Legal theorists, such as Bentham and Austin, from the end of
the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, and more
recently Hart, have described law as coercive orders separate from
morals. 7 8 Since they are called legal positivists, I will call a law that does
not contain natural
justice as an element "positivistic law" or "positivistic"
179
in this article.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Ward v. Wallis, 82 L.T.R. 261, 262 (Q.B. Div. 1900).
175. The Queen's Bench in Ward held that the rule of Marriotapplies to a case of mistake.
Id. (citing Marriot, 101 Eng. Rep. at 969).
176. Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 17.
177. Id. at 18-19.
178. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 594 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals].
Because this article is limited to cases involving payment by mistake, legal positivism is not
discussed. The theory advocated by Bentham, Austin, and Hart has been the subject of much
debate. For a discussion of the theory of legal positivism and a criticism of other theorists,
see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

(1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW]; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart,
The Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1964) (book review); Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, supra.
179. There are many forms of positivism. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note
178, at 248. A common tenet among them is the separation of law and morals. The rule
announced by Mansfield, as a judge of King's Bench, also may be called "a positive law,"
therefore, the terms "positivistic law" and "positivistic" are used in this article for the law

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

21

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. I1I

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5

Because positivistic rules developed by English courts after Marriot
could, in most cases, be created by analogy or by the inductive method, the
courts developed rules of recovery by mistake without any theory to
substitute the natural justice theory until Sinclair.80 In 1914, the court in
Sinclair, in order to determine whether the payee which, in exceeding its
power, received money was obliged to return it, looked into the foundation
of the obligation to return the payment under the rule of recovery. Lord
Chancellor Haldane said, "[T]he action was ... one which rested on a
promise to pay, either actual or imputed by law."''
Lord Parker stated
that the action for money had and received is based on "implied promise.' I 2 Twenty-three years later, in Morgan v. Ashcroft,183 another case
in which the court looked into the foundation of the obligation, both Judge
Greene and Judge Scott said that the claim was based on an imputed promise
to repay.'84 Scott added that the term "implied contract" was a misnomer.t85 He stated:
The name 'implied contracts' is ambiguous, as it is often used of true
consensual contracts, which are not wholly expressed in writing or
orally, and have to be inferred ...from the conduct of the parties.
The implied contract for money had and received has no element of
agreement
about it; it is implied in law, the name being a mis18 6
nomer.
So, the theory of "implied promise" is created by law and, as Scott
pointed out, the imputed promise is a quasi-contractual obligation. The
theory behind the rules allowing recovery of payment by mistake is now
firmly established. According to this theory, if recovery is granted it is
because the law imputes a promise on the part of the payee to repay the
money not because natural justice demands it. Similarly, if recovery is not
granted, it is because the law does not impute a promise.
Even though the court in Sinclair in 1914, introduced the theory of
imputed promise,' 87 until Morgan, the tone of the judges rejecting the

developed by English courts that does not contain natural justice as an element. Even though

these laws do not contain naturaljustice as an element, they are not necessarily contrary to
the notion of natural justice or morality. See Fibrosa, [1942] 2 All E.R. at 137 (statement by
Lord Wright); infra note 538 and accompanying text (quoting Lord Wright's statement).
180. See Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 1.
181. Id.
at 5.
182. Id.
at 13.
183. [1937] 3 All E.R. 92 (C.A.) (Eng.).
184. Id.
at 96, 101.
185. Id.
at 103.
186. Id.
187. Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 1.
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theory of natural justice was mild and polite. In Sinclair, Sumner politely
said that Mansfield had been misunderstood and that Mansfield's rule and the
theory founded upon it was not followed in Marriot.'8" Rolfe's statement
in Kelly v. Solari189 was stronger.
With respect to the argument, that money cannot be recovered back
except where it is unconscientious to retain it,. . . wherever it is paid
under a mistake of fact, and the party would not have paid it if the
fact had been known to him, it cannot be otherwise than unconscien19°
tious to retain it.
Greene in Morgan firmly rejected the theory of natural justice applied by
Mansfield in Moses, saying, "Lord Mansfield's views upon th[e]se matters
91
... cannot now be accepted as laying the true foundation of the claim."
In developing laws of recovery, the English courts formulated, through
a string of cases, certain rules by the method of analogy and induction,
characteristic of the common law system. However, it is inaccurate to say
that in general where payment is made by mistake, the law will impute a
promise to return. Sinclair itself is a case in which the court held that no
promise was implied or imputed. Since in each case the court only dealt
with the specific facts before it, courts never announced the general rules
under which law would impute a promise to pay. As late as 1937, Greene
in Morgan stated: "In general, no such promise can be imputed where the
payment was made under a mistake of law. Nor can a promise to repay be
imputed which . . . 'if made de facto [the law] would inexorably
avoid.' "192 He continued, "[T]he question still remains, in what circumstances will the law impute a promise to repay where the payment was made
193
under a mistake? That it will not do so in all circumstances is manifest."'
The English courts in Marriot and the cases decided thereafter departed
from the theory of natural justice, instead developing some rules under which
they allow a payer who made a payment by mistake to recover the payment.
Certainly, the English courts do not deny the notion of natural justice.".
All they say is that natural justice is not an element of the rules of recovery,

188. Id. at 18-19.

189. 152 Eng. Rep. 24 (Q.B. 1841).
190. Id. at 26.
191. Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 96.
192. Id. (quoting Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 17).

193. Id.

194. See, e.g., Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 10. Lord Dunedin stated that where goods for B.
were delivered to A. by mistake "it is clear that all ideas of natural justice are against allowing
A. to keep the property of B., which has somehow got into A.'s possession without any
intention on the part of B. to make a gift to A." Id.
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although the results of the application of positivistic law may be in accord
with the notion of natural justice. Notwithstanding the criticisms which have
been made against his theory, Mansfield's statement in Moses that the law
bases the action of money had and received on quasi ex contractu paves the
way for the development of modem law of quasi-contract. 195
A.

Where the Law Imputes a Promise to Pay

The English courts have, under positivistic rules, allowed recovery of
payment made by mistake in the following three situations.
1. Payer Does Not Intend Payee to Have Any Interest in the Payment
The first situation in which the law imputes a promise to pay is where
a payer makes a payment to another person whom the payer does not intend
to have any interest in the payment. This situation arises, in general, due to
a mistake as to the identity or the character of the payee. The rule deriving
from this situation seems to be simple and fair. It arose out of, or at least,
is in accord with, the notion of natural justice. Lord Dunedin said, "A
shopkeeper delivers an article at the house of B. in mistake for the house of
A. An action would lie against B. for restitution. Such an action could easily
be founded on the right of property."'"
If the person delivers money
instead of an article, no one doubts that the same rule of recovery applies.
However, when a payer sues to recover money instead of goods, the title to
the money invariably has passed to the defendant. So, the action is not based
on property. The effect of the action, if successful, is to impose a personal
obligation on the defendant to repay the money.197 Also, "the kind of
mistake that will ground recovery [in an action for money] is ...far wider
than the kind of mistake that will vitiate an intention to transfer property.,1A98

The case which laid down the rule for this situation is Colonial Bank v.
Exchange Bank. 99 Rogers & Son (Rogers), a firm in Yarmouth, Nova
Scotia, wished to send money to the Bank of British North America's (the
Bank of BNA) branch in Halifax. 2"
Rogers telegraphed its agent in
Antigua, McDonald & Co. (McDonald), to sell its goods on arrival and remit

195. See Hardane's statement in Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 5; see also Wright's statement in
Fibrosa, [1942] 2 All E.R. at 136.
196. Sinclair, 111 L.T.R at 10.
197. See WJ Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 530.
198. See id.
199. 11 A.C. 84 (P.C. 1886) (Eng.) (appeal taken from Can.).
200. Id. at 88.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5

24

1996]

PAYMENT BY MISTAKE

Chiang: Payment by Mistake in English Law

the money on its behalf to the bank in Halifax.2 °' McDonald delivered
US$3,000 from the sale of the goods to the Colonial Bank of Antigua
(Colonial Bank) and instructed them to make the remittance. "° However,
McDonald's instructions failed to specify that the money be sent to the
Halifax branch of the Bank of BNA.20 3 These instructions were delivered
to Colonial Bank's agent, Maitland, Phelps & Co. (Maitland), in New
York.2" Maitland erroneously told the Bank of BNA in New York to
credit Roger's account in the Yarmouth Bank. 0 5 The Bank of BNA told
Maitland that they did not have a Yarmouth branch and asked for more
instructions.2 6 When the Bank of BNA in New York received the
instructions, they read as follows: "Received from Messrs. Maitland, Phelps
& Co., Agents Colonial Bank of Antigua, the sum of $3000 for account of
Exchange Bank of Yarmouth credit of Rogers. 20 7 No explanation was
given why the name of the Exchange Bank of Yarmouth (Exchange Bank)
was introduced.20 8 Consequently, the US$3000 credit, no cash, intended
for the Bank of BNA branch in Halifax, ended up in the Exchange Bank of
Yarmouth. Since Rogers happened to be indebted to the Exchange Bank at
that time, the Exchange Bank credited their account to the debit of the Bank
of BNA.2° Subsequently, Rogers became aware of the error and informed
the Exchange Bank.21 0 Colonial Bank requested the Exchange Bank to pay
out the US$3000 to the Halifax branch of the Bank BNA.211 The Exchange Bank refused, saying the US$3000 had already been used. 1 2
action for money had and received for the
Colonial Bank brought this
213
recovery of the US$3000.
In the lower court, a verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs. 21 4 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia set aside the verdict and ordered

201. Id. The goods were on board the ship Pronto, which was then making its way to the
island of Antigua. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. McDonald's instructions read: "Draft on New York in favour of Bank British
North America. Draft for Rogers credit Yarmouth." Id.
204. Id. at 87.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. The court suspected that "the Bank of British North America had correspondence with
the Exchange Bank of Yarmouth, and they conceived that was the proper way of remitting the
funds to Yarmouth." Id.
209. Id. at 88.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.at 84.
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a new trial.215 The plaintiffs appealed to the Privy Council, which reversed
the judgment of the Supreme Court.2 16 Lord Hobhouse, speaking for the
unanimous court, said that "the money was received by the defendants, not
to their own use, but by mistake. 21 7 So, the question before the court was
whether the plaintiffs were "entitled to demand that the money should be
recalled and put into the channel in which it was originally intended to be
put. '218 He then went on to say that the defendants' duty was to pay either
the plaintiffs or, at the request of the plaintiffs, the Bank of British North
America. 219 He reasoned that "if [the defendants] had insisted on restoring
it to the persons from whom it came to them - that is the plaintiffs - all
parties would have been satisfied, because then it would have reached the
quarter for which it was originally intended. Instead of that, .. . they choose
to keep it for themselves." 220 He concluded that the defendants now were
obliged to refund. 221 Although the court did not say much on the law
itself, it is clear that the holding is that when the money was not intended for
the payee, the payer who mistakenly paid the payee may recover the money.
The rule is true even if the money belonged to a debtor of the payee.
This rule of recovery was confirmed by the House of Lords in Kleinwort,
Sons, & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. 222 Kleinwort, Son & Co. (Kleinwort)
were bankers who regularly financed Kramrisch and Co. (Kramrisch), a firm
of rubber merchants, upon the security of rubber.223 Dunlop Rubber Co.
(Dunlop) was a regular buyer of rubber from Kramrisch.224 In 1902,
Kramrisch instructed Dunlop to send all future payments directly to
Kleinwort. 225 Kramrisch also borrowed from another banker, Brandt, upon
similar security.2 6 In 1903, Kramrisch sent a shipment of rubber to
Dunlop with the instructions to make their payment to Brandt, who had
financed the purchase and held an equitable mortgage on it.227 In error,
Dunlop sent the payment to Kleinwort, who received it in good faith.228
Subsequently, Kramrisch failed, and Dunlop was held in an action by Brandt

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
97 L.T.R. 263 (1907) (H.L. App. Ct.) (Eng.).
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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liable to pay them the purchase price again. 22 9 Dunlop in this action
claimed to recover from Kleinwort the money paid on the ground of mistake
of fact. 230 The trial court held for the plaintiff, and on appeal, the judgment was affirmed.2 31 On further appeal by the defendant, the House of
Lords again affirmed the judgment.232
There is no doubt that in this case the payer made the payment to the
payee which was not intended for him. The plaintiff contended that by
receiving the money the defendants were not agents, but rather were
principals and even if they had paid the money out to others, they still were
liable to pay it back.233 Lord Chancellor Loreburn responded, "[T]his is
immaterial; for it is indisputable that, if money is paid under a mistake of
fact and is redemanded from the person who received it before his position
has been altered to his disadvantage, the money must be repaid in whatever
character it was received."23 4
Even though Kramrisch also was indebted to Kleinwort, and Kleinwort
had received the money in belief that they were equitable assignees of the
debt owed to them, Lord Atkinson thought that "the legal result of the receipt
of and dealing with the money must depend on the true facts, and not in the
erroneous impressions of the receivers at the time when they received it. ' 235
It is notable that the payer's intention was not conveyed to the defendant, but
the court nevertheless allowed recovery.
Thus, a general rule of recovery may be derived from the cases discussed
in the first situation. The rule is: where a payer makes a payment to another
person and the payee turns out to be other than the person intended, the
payer may recover the payment on the ground of mistake. The courts in
ColonialBank and Kleinwort did not mention the theory upon which the rule
was based. A theory upon which the rule of recovery could be based was
23 6
introduced in Sinclair.
The rule of recovery applicable to this situation is subject to one
exception. The exception is as follows: where money is received by the
payee exceeding its statutory capacity, the payer who pays by mistake as to
the payee's capacity is not entitled to recover the money. This exceptional
rule was announced in Sinclair, where the mistake was with respect to the

229. Id.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 1.
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character of the payee.237 The case is important in two aspects. First, it
was the first case since the Marriot court's rejection of natural justice in
which an English court applied a theory of imputed promise and from which
English courts have developed positivistic rules based on the theory of
imputed promise, for over a century. Secondly, the case was decided by the
House of Lords, the highest court in England. To date, the House of Lords
23 8
has not repealed the theory of imputed promise.
The action in Sinclair was brought by depositors of a building society to
recover money deposited and received by the society.239 The Birkbeck
Permanent Benefit Building Society (Birkbeck) was formed under the
Building Societies Act of 1836.2" Its purpose was to allow its members
to create a fund to be used by individual members to buy or build
houses.24 ' The rules of the Act gave the directors the power to borrow
without limit, but within the legitimate purposes of Birkbeck.242 There
were two classes of shareholders: those to whom loans were granted and
those who were mere investors.243 The investing shares were divided into
A shares and B shares. A shares would mature and could be paid off; while
the B shares were permanent. 2 " In the beginning, the funds deposited with
Birkbeck were lent out as mortgages to its members. 245 As Birkbeck's
deposits increased, it began to do the business of a banker. 2' Birkbeck
started to call itself the Birkbeck Bank in 1871.247
Later, Birkbeck ran into trouble, and an order was made to wind it
up.2 4' The remaining funds were not enough to satisfy all its creditors, the
A and B shareholders, and the customers of the bank on deposit and current
accounts.249 Judge Neville, sitting alone in Chancery Division of High
Court of Justice,250 pursuant to the request of the liquidator, directed that

237. Id. at 3. Specifically, the mistake was with respect to the statutory capacity of an
association. The powers of an association created by a statute also is limited by the statute.
A mistake with respect to its statutory capacity to receive money is a mistake with respect to
its character.
238. In 1940, Asquith in Weld Blundell, still said that the claim was based on imputed
promise. [1940] 2 All E.R. at 583.
239. Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 3.
240. Building Societies Act of 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch.32 (Eng.).
241. Sinclair, Ill L.T.R. at 3.
242. Id.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.

250. Normally such cases were heard in King's Bench. This case was heard in Chancery
perhaps because the plaintiffs had asked for the remedy of equitable distribution.
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the assets be applied to paying the costs of winding-up, paying the outside
creditors, and paying the A and B shareholders, and then the remaining
balance was to be divided pro rata among the depositors. 25 ' The depositors, claiming priority over the shareholders, appealed.2 52 During the
appeal, the depositors and A shareholders reached a compromise.253 The
Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court decision, and the B shareholders
obtained priority over the depositors.254 Consequently, the depositors
appealed to the House of Lords.255
The plaintiffs alleged that they paid their money under a mistake of fact,
or for a consideration that has wholly failed, or that it has been had and
received by the society to their use, citing Moses256 and some other cases,
in support. 257 Although Lord Sumner said that there was no mistake of
fact, no failure of consideration, and the depositors' money was not had and
received by the society, 258 the other judges expressed their opinions on the
basis that deposits were made under a mistake of fact. 259 The depositors
deposited the money mistakenly believing that the Society was either
indebted to them or had entered into a contract for repayment with them.2 6
The House of Lords was unanimous in holding that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover on the ground of mistake.26'
Lord Dunedin saw the case as analogous to a situation where the payer
made a payment to a wrong person. He said that
all ideas of natural justice are against allowing A. to keep the
property of B., which has somehow got into A's possession without
any intention on the part of B. to make a gift to A. Where there is
But there are
contract the solution is according to the contract ....
is
no
contract.
where
there
cases
many
The case of a chattel is easy: A shopkeeper delivers an article
at the house of B. in mistake for the house of A. An action would
lie against B.... on the right of property,. . . jus in re. And where

251. Id. at 2; Re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Bldg. Soc'y, 105 L.T.R. 780 (1911).
252. Sinclair, 11l L.T.R. at 2.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676.
257. Sinclair, I I I L.T.R. at 2.
258. Id. at 17-18.
259. Id. at 5.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1. The House of Lords, however, ruled that the liquidator should apportion the
entirety of the remaining assets between the depositors and the shareholders in proportion to
the amounts paid by the depositors and by the shareholders respectively on a different ground.
Id. at 8.
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there was ajus in re there would not be ... any difficulty in finding
a form of common law action to fit the situation. But ... for a
fungible, and especially.. . money, then [there is no] jus in re ...
[and no appropriate] common law action. The familiar case is the
paying money by A. to B. under the mistaken impression in fact that
a debt was due, when in truth there was no debt due. It was to fit
cases of this sort that the common law evolved the action for money
had and received.2 62
Dunedin continued to state that without doubt the defendant had an
obligation to repay for money had and received, creating a debt equal to that
of "all proper creditors., 263 Thus, the House of Lords confirmed the rule
that a payer may recover a payment which the payer delivered by mistake to
the payee whom the payer did not intend to have any interest in the payment.
All five judges of the House of Lords sitting in the case agreed that the
rule's foundation is imputed promise or quasi-contract. Lord Chancellor
Haldane said that "[c]onsideration of the authorities led [him] to the
one
conclusion that the action [for money had and received] was in principle
2
which rested on a promise to pay, either actual or imputed by law. 1
Dunedin also considered that any promise to refund the money is a
fiction of law, and therefore imputed by law, stating that "it is a contrivance
which is introduced to meet an equitable idea, which idea is wider idea than
that expressed by the proposition that when there is ajus in re an action will
lie, and when there is not such a jus it will not., 265 Lord Parker of
Waddington added, "The implied promise on which the action for money had
and received is based would be precisely that promise which the company or
association could not lawfully make. ' 26 That he regarded the obligation
to pay, if any, as implied promise is clear.
Lord Sumner, in accepting the theory of imputed promise, also
denounced the theory of natural justice, stating that "[a]ll these causes of
action are common species of the genus assumpsit. All now rest ... upon
a[n]... imputed promise to repay. The law cannot dejure impute promises
to repay, whether for money had and received or otherwise, which, if made
de facto, it would inexorably avoid." 267 Sumner then commented on
Mansfield's theory. He first said that Mansfield's language had been

262. Id. at 10. Lord Dundin emphasized that he meant "equitable" in nontechnical sense,
and did not mean to suggest[] for a moment that the action was borrowed from technical
equity." Id.at 10-11.
263. Id. at 11.
264. Id.at 5 (Atkinson, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 11.
266. Id. at 13.
267. Id. at 17.
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misunderstood, and then implied that if Mansfield actually had done what the
subsequent courts understood him to have done, he would have misapplied
the law. Sumner said, "Lord Mansfield did not conceive himself to be
deciding that this action was one in which ... it was understood in the
Courts of Chancery, and the cases actually decided show that the description
of the action as being founded in the aequum et bonum is very far from
being precise. ' 2 s
Sumner then said that the theory of natural justice had been rejected in
the early cases. He referred to Marriot as supporting the proposition that
money is not recoverable in all cases where it is unconscionable for the
defendant to retain it. Furthermore, while the court may have been
complacent in regards to its holding in Moses, early protests were made
against its holding in the Common Pleas and in Miller v. Atlee Pollack,
C.B.269 Sumner stated that no ground exists "for suggesting as a recognizable 'equity' the right to recover money in personam merely because it
would be the right and fair thing that it should be refunded to the payer."27
But, after stating that the foundation of the obligation to pay in an action
for money had and received was imputed promise, the court went on to hold
that where the defendant received the money exceeding its statutory capacity,
no such promise would be imputed. Haldane, with the concurrence of
Atkinson, explained as follows:
To hold that a remedy will lie in personam of a statutory society,
which by hypothesis cannot in the case in question have become a
debtor, or entered into any contract for repayment, is to strike at the
root of the doctrine of ultra vires . . . . That doctrine belongs to
substantive law and is the outcome of statute, and cannot be made
different by any choice of form in procedure.27 1
He went on to say that the doctrine of ultra vires "must now be treated as
established in a stringent form by Acts of the Legislature and decisions of
great authority which have interpreted these Acts," a binding principle both
at law and in equity.272 Thus, any claim in personam that the defendant
has been "improperly enriched" at the expense of the plaintiff by an ultra
vires transaction is excluded.273 Haldane further felt that English law could
not "impute the fiction of ...a promise where it would have ultra vires to

268. Id.
at 18.
269. Id.at 19 (citations omitted).

270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
at 5.
Id.
Id.
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give it. . . . For to impute a fictitious promise is simply to presume the
existence of a state of facts, and the presumption can give rise to no higher
right than would result if the facts were actual."274
These statements reflect the essence of legal positivism. Applying these
principles to the matter at hand, Haldane concluded that the Birkbeck
Society, contrary to the provisions of the Building Society Act, by carrying
on the business of banking ultra vires, contracts entered into for the purpose
of this business were thus void, and the deposits could not be recovered in
an action for money had and received unless it could be traced back to the
Birkbeck or its agents in an in rem proceeding.27 Thus, the case created
a rule: where a payer delivers money to an association by mistake as to its
capacity to receive money, and the association exceeds its statutory capacity
in receiving the money, the payer may not recover the payment. In such
case, the law will not impute a promise to return.
This is the first case in which the court used the concept of imputed
promise in substantive law in deciding whether a payer may recover the
money paid by mistake. In justifying his conclusion, Haldane stated,
Moses is the leading case... [of] an action on the case for money
had and received under circumstances where any notion of an actual
contract was excluded. But Lord Mansfield explained how in such
circumstances the law treated the defendant as being in the same
position as if he had incurred a debt: "If the defendant be under an
obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to refund, the law implies
a debt, and gives this action, founded on the equity of the plaintiff's
case, as it were upon a contract. 276
Dunedin explained the obligation to refund in such cases to be quasicontractual in nature. He reasoned that English common law divides actions
into those of contract and of tort, while Roman law divides them into those
of ex contractu and quasi ex contractu, ex delicto and quasi ex delicto. The
instant case deals with actions quasi ex contractu. With reference to money
issues, the terms mutuum and pro-mutuum are used. Pro-mutum deals with
situations where money was "had and received without contract, and a special
form of action for the common case of the payment of a supposed but nonexisting debt was known as conditio indebiti. Now, that the English law
having no quasi contracts, got over the difficulty in such cases as the action
277
for money had and received by the fiction of a contract.,

274. Id. at 6.

275. Id.
276. Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 11.
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I have discussed the statements of all judges who expressed their
opinions on the subject for two reasons. One is that I do not wish to leave
any slightest doubt that the English courts, at their highest level, unanimously
expressed the view that the theory of imputed promise or quasi-contract is
today the foundation of the rules allowing recovery for money had and
received, including payment made by mistake.
The second reason is to show that the court in this case needed the
theory to reach its conclusion. The rule of recovery laid down by Mansfield
uses "justice" or "conscience" as a test. The rule apparently rests on the
theory of natural justice. Had the rule of recovery been based on natural
justice theory, the only consideration in determining whether the plaintiff
could recover the money would have been whether the defendant might in
justice keep the money. The court might have reached a different result.27
2 79
Since the decision of Marriot,
for more than a century, the English
courts have developed some positivistic rules allowing recovery of money
without a theory upon which the rules were founded. Until Sinclair,the rules
created by the English courts could stand on the rules themselves without
resting on any theory. But in Sinclair,the House of Lords came up with the
theory of imputed promise or quasi contract in substantive law for the first
time. 80 Here, the court had to decide whether the money received by the
payee exceeding its statutory authority (ultra vires) had to be returned under
the rules. The issue forced the court first time to examine the foundation or
the theory on which the payee was bound to return where no problem of
ultra vires existed. Having unanimously rejected the theory of natural justice
as the basis for the positivistic rule, the court had to come up with a theory
for the return of money to be applied to a situation where the money was

278. Parker of Waddington said, "[I]t would be unconscionable for the society to retain the
amount by which its assets had been increased by, and in fact still represented, the borrowed
money." Id. at 15. Sumner indicated that under the Mansfield rule the court also might have
to consider the equity of the shareholders. The Court noted that
for anyone to keep the depositors' money as against them would be unconscientious,
while that they should get it back would be eminently ex aequo et bono, though it
appeared also that conscience had nothing to say against payment of the depositors
in full at the expense of the shareholders, though all must be deemed alike cognisant
of the invalidity of the society's banking business.
Id. at 18.
279. Marriot, 101 Eng. Rep. at 969.
280. Although as early as 1849, an attorney had used the term "implied contract." In
Miller v. Atlee, 154 Eng. Rep. 1068 (1849), an action in debt for work and labor as an
attorney, the attorney for the plaintiff, in response to the claim of the defendant of a set-off
for money had and received, argued, "No debt ever existed which could form the subject of
a set-off." Id. The defendant is in the same situation as if he had brought an action for
money had and received, on an implied contract. Id. The court did not comment on his
theory of "implied contract." Id.
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received ultra vires. The court created a legal picture that the law imputes
a promise by the payee to refund the money in such cases. Since the
promise to return money was a fiction created by law, the promise was also
limited by law. The act of the Parliament created the capacity of the
association to receive deposits and also created a promise to refund the
money received within its capacity. In this case, the money(deposits) was
received by the payee in exceeding its statutory power. Since the law did not
create the power in the association to receive such money, it did not and
could not impute a promise to return the money.
The theory of imputed promise or quasi contract in English law initially
evolved from the theory of natural justice, and finally became a separate
theory for recovery. In Moses,2"' Mansfield came up with the concept of
implied debt and quasi contract merely to justify the form of action, that is,
indebitatus assumpsit, under which the plaintiff brought the action. He did
not say that the law implies a promise. 2s However, the terms "implied
debt" and "quasi contract" mentioned by him, paved the way for the
development of another theory, viz. imputed promise, in substantive law,
which ultimately replaced the substantive rule which Mansfield applied.
2.

Payment for a Particular Purpose That the Payee Cannot Carry Out

The second situation in which the law imputes a promise to pay is where
a payer makes a payment to another person for a particular purpose and the
other person cannot carry out the intended purpose. A case that involved this
situation is Kerrison v. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co.2" 3 In this case, the Bote
Mining Co., a Mexican company, had an account with Kessler & Co.
(Kessler), a New York banker.2 Kerrison, a London firm, had a standing
arrangement with Kessler, by virtue of which Kessler was to honor the drafts
of the Bote Mining Co. to the extent of £500.2"5 Kerrison, in turn, agreed
"to recoup" Kessler by payment of the sum of £500 into Kessler's account
with the defendants Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. (Glyn), the London correspondent of Kessler.2
In 1907, Kessler wrote to Kerrison informing him that the Bote Mining
Co. had been credited with £500 and requested him to pay that amount to
Kessler's account with Glyn; Kerrison complied. 8 7 At the time of
payment, the Bote Mining Co. had issued checks against that credit in favor

281. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676.
282. See Fibrosa, [1942] 2 All E.R. at 136.

283. [1911-13] All E.R. 417 (H.L.) (1911) (Eng.) [hereinafter Kerrison 1].

284.
285.
286.
287.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of third parties, which had not yet been presented to Kessler for payment.288 Also, at the time of payment, Kessler without the knowledge of
either Kerrison or Glyn had become bankrupt, and the checks were never
paid.28 9
Upon learning of Kessler's bankruptcy, Kerrison applied to Glyn for the
return of the £500 payment. 2 ° Because Kerrison was indebted to Glyn at
the time, Glyn refused; consequently, Kerrison brought the action against
Glyn to recover the money.291 Judge Hamilton, sitting as Commercial
Court without a jury, granted a judgment for the plaintiff.292 There was a
dispute as to whether Kerrison was already under a legal liability towards
293
Kessler to pay the £500 in question when he paid it to the defendants.
Hamilton concluded that Kerrison was paying the money only in voluntary
anticipation of what might very shortly have become his actual legal liability
and that at the actual moment when he paid the money he had not come
under any legal liability to pay it. 294 The Court of Appeal reversed the
judgment below on the ground that, in its opinion, based on the facts
inferred, when Kerrison paid the money, he was already under a legal
liability towards Kessler to pay, and therefore, there was no mistake on the
part of Kerrison. 295 The House of Lords, on the appeal of the plaintiff,
unanimously reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 296 The House
agreed with Judge Hamilton on the inference drawn from the facts in
evidence.297

This case is distinguishable from Sinclair, in that, in Sinclair,the payee
by statute had no capacity to receive the deposits, 29 while in Kerrison no
problem existed with respect to the defendants' (Glyn's) capacity to receive
money.299 Even considering that the defendants received the money as
agents for Kessler, Kessler had the capacity to receive the money though it
had ceased to do business and, therefore, was not capable of carrying out the
purpose for which the money was delivered. Judge Hamilton stated that
Kerrison "paid the money under... mistake of fact" because he mistakenly

288. Id. at 421.
289. Id. at 422.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 421.
292. Kerrison v. Glyn, Mills, Currie, & Co., 101 L.T.R. 675 (K.B. Div. 1910) (Eng.)
[hereinafter Kerrison II]. Judge Hamilton became Lord Sumner. Jones, [1926] All E.R. at
36, 44.
293. Kerrison II, 101 L.T.R. at 674.
294. Id. at 676.
295. Kerrison v. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co., 102 L.T.R. 674 (C.A.) (K.B. 1910) (Eng.).
296. Kerrison I, [1911-13] All E.R. at 417.
297. Id. at 418.
298. Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 1.
299. Kerrison l, [1911-13] All E.R. at 422.
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believed that Kessler was solvent and would remunerate him. 300 If
Kerrison had known otherwise, he would never have paid the money.30 1
On the substantive law, Lord Atkinson held that the plaintiff could
recover the money from Kessler, if the money had been paid to Kessler. He
stated that Kerrison was unaware of any advance of Kessler's money to Bote.
Kerrison paid Kessler believing that Kessler was solvent and would therefore
honor the drafts. However, Kessler was "incapable of carrying on business,
making advances, or doing the very things which [Kerrison] lodged this
money to their credit to enable them to do .... [O]n general principles he
would be entitled to recover money paid in ignorance of these vital matters,
as money paid in mistake of fact., 30 2 Atkinson further said, "If [the
money] had been transmitted direct by post, neither Kessler & Co. nor their
assignees in bankruptcy could.., 303have retained it. It would be against good
morals to permit them to do So.
As to the right of Kerrison to recover from the defendants, Atkinson
stated that if a person sends payment to another for services with the
mistaken belief that the other person is alive, then the person sending the
payment is entitled to recover the payment from the payment's recipient,
whether this is the deceased's agent or personal representative. 304 This is
true even if the person sending the payment was indebted to the payment's
recipient. 3 5 This also is true even if the deceased had authorized his agent
to use the payment to offset the debt owed to the agent. 30 6 The defendants
in this example cannot "have a better right to hold the money than Kessler
& Co. would have had. 30 7
Thus, a second general rule of recovery may be derived from the case
discussed in this situation. The rule is: a payer may recover a payment
which the payer made by mistake as to the payee's capability to deliver the
payment for a particular purpose. Mersey cited Kleinwort,30 8 probably
because he considered the case analogous to a case where a payer did not
intend the payee to have any interest in the money. Nevertheless, this second
rule is narrower and more specific than the first general rule.

300. Kerrison II, 101 L.T.R. at 676.
301. Id.
302. Kerrison I, [1911-13] All E.R. at 422.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. Lord Mersey concurred, further stating that if Kerrison had paid Kessler directly,
it would have been wrong for Kessler to accept it. Id. at 423-24.
308. Kleinwort, 97 L.T.R. at 263.
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3.

Payment Without a Consideration

The third situation in which the law imputes a promise to pay is where
a payer makes a payment without a consideration. This is the situation in
Hewer.3" When a person delivers the money to another whom the payer
does not intend to have any interest in the money as described in the first
situation, the payer has received or may receive a consideration from a third
person. Likewise, where a person delivers the money to another for a
particular purpose and the payee cannot carry out the intended purpose as
described in the second situation, the payer has received or may receive a
consideration from the payee or a third person. This third situation is
distinguishable from the two situations discussed above. In this situation, the
payer receives no consideration from any person for the payment.31 °
Payment without a consideration or payment without receiving a consideration discussed herein includes payment upon a consideration which has
failed.
Where a party to a contract received money from the other party pursuant
to the contract fails to perform the contract, it may be argued that any time
there is such a failure, the payer made a mistake in that the payer thought
that the payee would perform the contract. There is no question that in such
a case an action for money had and received will lie3" for the recovery of
the money paid. 312 But this kind of mistake is with respect to what will
happen after the payment and is not the kind of mistake discussed in this
article. The mistake which this article deals with is a mistake of fact which
exists or has already occurred at the time of the payment.31 3
309. Hewer, 78 Eng. Rep. at 855.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. The payment made by Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company to the Chinese school mentioned in the introduction falls into this category.
311. See Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676.
312. The payer, however, has the option of suing for breach of contract instead of money
had and received. In an action for breach of contract, the payer is not limited to recover his
payment. He also may recover damages resulting from the breach.
313. Lord Shaw in R.E. Jones explained the distinction between the two as follows:
It is here necessary to observe - what is indeed very elementary as a
distinction - that the imposition of a condition has relation to the future, whereas
a mistake in fact has relation to the past. When a document is granted, a deed
signed or a payment made under a mistake in fact, that mistake has reference to
occurrences which have taken place or things which have been done prior to or at
the time of the transaction ....
The true facts may not have been known or may
have been misrepresented with such a result that the mind of the grantor does not
go with the transaction at all; his mind goes with another transaction, and he is
meaning to give effect to that other transaction depending upon facts different from
those which were the true facts.
On the other hand, the imposition of a condition upon the making of a
payment or the granting of a deed or the making of a transaction - the imposition
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In Hewer, the court in granting the recovery of money paid, said that the
money paid to Bartholomew was Hewer's money. 14 Even though Hewer
gave it to Bartholomew, "supposing it to be no payment; yet in regard he did
not give it otherwise, nor upon other consideration, [and Bartholomew]
received them as [Hewer's] money and is accountable for them., 315 So,
Hewer, who delivered the money to Bartholomew, received no consideration.
Certainly, in the cases to be discussed in this third situation, the courts did
not always state that receiving no consideration for the payment is an element
of the rule of recovery. Sometimes, they did not even point out that the
payer received no consideration for the payment. But, in each case, as a
matter of fact, where the payer was allowed to recover, the payer received no
consideration for the payment.
Another fact in Hewer which the court did not note, but which
subsequently raised the question as to whether such a fact constitutes an
element of the rule of recovery. That fact is this: if the mistaken fact were
true - the money had belonged to the payee, Bartholomew - the payee
would be entitled to the payment and the payer, Hewer, would be legally
obliged to give it to him.
Two and a half centuries after Hewer was decided, the case of Harrisv.
Loyd,316 an action in assumpsit for money had and received, came before
the Court of Exchequer.3 17 In this case, one Carter made an assignment in
trust for the benefit of creditors. 31 Before the assignment's execution, a
judgement creditor of Carter caused a writ of execution against goods of
Carter that had been delivered to the sheriff's office in London.3" 9 The
next day, the officer took possession of them. 20 In order to release the
goods, the trustees of the general assignment paid the officer the amount of
the levy under protest, whereupon the sheriff surrendered possession.32 '
of a condition as to what is to be done at the conclusion of the transaction or the
receipt of the money - that affects the future, and if that condition as a matter of
obligation is not carried forward so as to reach the recipient of the money it cannot
affect him. How this class of case can be said in any way to bear upon or modify
a natural case of mistake in fact I am really at a loss to understand.
R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 690-91.
314. Hewer, 78 Eng. Rep. at 856.
315. Id.
316. 151 Eng. Rep. 183 (Q.B. 1839).
317. Prior to the Judicature Act of 1873, the Court of Exchequer was one of the four
superior courts at Westminster, originally set up by William the Conqueror in the eleventh
century. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 357. It was inferior in rank to both
the King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. Id. It had both an equity side and a
common-law side until 1842 when its equity jurisdiction was removed by statute. Id.
318. Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 183.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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It subsequently turned out, unknown to the trustees at the time of
payment, that Carter had become bankrupt a few days before the payment,
thus, making the assignment void." The trustees brought the action to
recover the money to the sheriff's officer on the ground that they had paid
under a mistake of fact. 323 The trial judge was of opinion that this type
mistake of fact did not entitle the plaintiffs to recover the money, and
accordingly directed a nonsuit.324 The plaintiffs obtained a rule nisi,
against which the defendant showed cause. 325 The Court, affirming the
trial judge's decision, discharged the rule nisi. By 1839, when Harris was
decided, the landmark case of Marrio326 had already stood for forty-two
years. Harris is nevertheless significant because it was the first case in
which the English court applied a positivistic law in a case of payment by
mistake.
That Harriswas a case where the payer received no consideration for his
payment is clear. Denying the claim, Abinger stated:
The plaintiffs appear to have been volunteers. Suppose the friends
of the debtor had paid the money, and the possession of the goods
had been thereupon delivered back to him; could they have recovered
it back, upon its afterwards turning
out that he had previously
32 7
committed an act of bankruptcy?
In Abinger's hypothesis, the friends of the debtor received no consideration
for their payment. It would appear that Abinger was aware of the fact that
in this case the trustees received no consideration for the payment when he
rendered the ruling.
The plaintiff argued that there was a mistake in that the trustee made the
payment in exchange for the release of the goods on the supposition that the
assignment was valid and it turned out otherwise. 328 Abinger said that "the
money was not paid under a mistake of fact, but upon a speculation, the
failure of which cannot entitle the plaintiffs to recover it back. '329 He
denied recovery because the plaintiffs were volunteers. 330 According to

322. Id. at 184.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Marriot, 101 Eng. Rep. at 969 (applying a positivistic rule contrary to the notion of
natural justice in determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the money).
327. Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 185.
328. Id. at 184.
329. Id. at 185.
330. Id. The defendant argued, "At the time of the seizure, the plaintiffs had option either
to suffer the sheriff to sell the goods or to pay him the amount of the levy that he might
withdraw. They voluntarily chose to do the latter." Id. at 184.
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Abinger, once it was found that the payment was voluntary rather than out
of legal obligation, recovery would be denied whether or not there was a
mistake. Nevertheless, the rule that Abinger applied to deny recovery would,
in his mind, also apply to an action on the ground of mistake. For Abinger
used a hypothesis involving a mistake.331
Abinger did not define the term "volunteers." Neither the trustees in the
case, nor the friends of the debtor in Abinger's hypothesis, had obligations
to pay the levying creditor for the goods. Thus, whether or not the payers
made a mistake they were "volunteers" because they were not legally obliged
to anyone to pay for the debtor's debt and recover the goods. The holding
in Harris, as expressed by Abinger, supports a proposition that the rule of
recovery on mistake where the payer receives no consideration contains an
element that the payer is legally obliged to pay under the mistaken fact.
Two years after Harriswas decided, the same court in 1841, had to deal
with the renowned case of Kelly,332 which contained an action of assumpsit
for recovery of money had and received. In this case, one Solari effected a
policy on his life with the Argus Assurance Company.333 He had not paid
a premium on the policy due in September 1840 when he died in October. 334 In November, two of the directors, Bates and Clift, were told by
the firm's actuary that the policy had lapsed because the premium had not
been paid, whereupon Clift wrote the word "lapsed" on the policy.335 In
February of the next year, the defendant, the widow of Solari, applied to the
Argus office for payout of the policy.336 Forgetting that the policy has
lapsed, three of the directors wrote a check in payment. 337 When the error
was discovered, a director brought this action to recover the sum on the
ground of payment by mistake.338
At trial, Lord Chief Abinger, on the question of mistake, instructed the
jury that if the directors had known or the means of knowing that the policy
had lapsed, the plaintiff could not recover regardless of the fact that the
directors forgot the fact.339 Abinger directed a nonsuit, reserving leave to
the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for him. 34 The plaintiff obtained
a rule nisi, and the defendant showed cause. 341' The four judges sitting in

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. 185. He put his answer in the form of question.
Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
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B., Gruney,
the Court of Exchequer at the hearing were Abinger B., Parke,
3 43
B., and Rolfe, B.3 42 All judges ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
I would like to discuss the opinions of the judges in Kelly in detail for
two reasons. First, this case laid down a general rule of recovery of payment
made by mistake that is cited as authority by the House of Lords in R.E.
Jones Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow Ltd.3" and many other cases. Second, the
opinions of the judges expressed, explicitly or implicitly, the view that in the
situation where the payer receives no consideration, the rule of recovery
contains an element that the payer is legally obliged to pay under the
mistaken fact and the payer pays with intention of discharging the obligation.
Undoubtedly, in Kelly the directors received no consideration. Although
the judges did not mention consideration in discussing the rule of recovery,
Scott, L.J., in a subsequent case stated, "The mind of the court was, in all
the cases where the statement has been made, concentrated on the particular
circumstances under discussion, and was expressing a conclusion appropriate
to the facts before it, rather than attempting to lay down any absolute or
general rule of law., 345 The contract lapsed during the lifetime of
Solari. 3 46 So, at the time the company made the payment, no valid contract
existed between the company and Solari or between the company and
Solari's wife. The directors made the payment to settle an invalid claim.
With respect to the rule of recovery for mistake, Abinger concentrated
on the knowledge, or the lack of it, of the directors, which led to the mistake.
Feeling that he had been given too broad an interpretation of the rule, he
further refined it:
The safest rule however is, that if the party makes the payment with
full knowledge of the facts, although under ignorance of the law,
there being no fraud on the other side, he cannot recover it back
again. There may also be cases in which, although he might by
investigation learn the state of facts more accurately, he declines to
do so, and chooses to pay the money notwithstanding; in that case
...he is equally bound. Then there is a third case ... where the
party had once a full knowledge of the facts, but has since forgotten
them. ... I think the knowledge of the facts which disentitles the
party from recovering, must mean a knowledge existing in the mind
at the time of payment.347

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

All, except Parke, had sat in Harristwo years earlier.
Id. But the court granted a new trial for the jury to try the issue. Id. at 25.
[1926] A.C. 670 (H.L.) (Eng.).
Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 102.
Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 24.
Id.
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Applying the rule to this case, he said that he had "little doubt ... that the
directors had forgotten the fact, . . . but as [the attorney for the defendant]
certainly ha[d] a right to have that question submitted to the jury, there must
be a new trial. 348
Thus, although Abinger did not in his opinion state a complete general
rule under which the plaintiff may recover, he in effect held that the rule of
recovery of payment made by mistake applied where the payer had forgotten
the knowledge at the time of the payment, even though he had knowledge of
the fact at one time.
On the rule of recovery, Parke concurred with Abinger's opinion. He
reasoned that where money is paid to another on a mistaken supposition,
which he otherwise would not have paid had the facts been known, the payor
will have an action to recover. He further held that to retain such money
would be "against conscience., 349 By using the phrase "it is against
conscience to retain it," Parke sounded as if the rule he announced was
grounded on natural justice. However, his statements concerning the
knowledge of the true facts of the situation stated a positivistic rule,
independent of the theory of natural justice, under which recovery was
allowed. The additional statement "and it is against conscience to retain it"
was not necessary to nor a part of the rule.
Rolfe, who also concurred, flatly rejected natural justice as an element
of the rule and as the theory for recovery, stating that "[w]ith respect to the
argument money cannot be recovered back except where it is unconscientious
to retain it, it seems to me that whenever it is paid under a mistake of fact,
and the party would not have paid it if the fact had been known to him, it
cannot be otherwise than unconscientious to retain it., 350 In Rolfe's
opinion, the test for allowing recovery was not whether it was unconscientious for the defendant to retain the money, for, according to him, in all such
cases, it was. The implication was that the rule did not rest on natural justice
and the positivistic rule laid down by Parke stood by itself.
An element of the positivistic rule of recovery in a situation where the
payer receives no consideration may be derived from the quoted statement
of Parke. This element is that the payer is legally obliged to pay under the
mistaken fact. Parke said, "Where money is paid to another.., upon the
supposition that a specific fact is true, which would entitle the other to the
money . . . an action will lie to recover it back. 35 ' If the policy had not
expired, Solari's widow would be entitled to the payment under the policy.

348.
349.
350.
351.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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The proposition of Parke is that the payer is allowed to recover if the payee
is entitled to the money under a mistaken fact. If the payee is entitled to the
money under the mistaken fact, the payer is legally obliged to pay under the
mistaken fact.
The intention of the payer also is crucial in order for the payer to recover
the payment, for example, the payer makes the payment with intention to
discharge a legal obligation. Parke said,
If, indeed, the money is intentionally paid, without reference to the
truth or falsehood of the fact, the plaintiff meaning to waive all
inquiry into it, and that the person receiving shall have the money at
all events, whether the fact be true or false, the latter is certainly
entitled to retain it; but if it is paid under the impression of the truth
of a fact which is untrue, it may... be recovered back, however
careless the party paying may have been, in omitting to use due
diligence to inquire into the fact. In such a case the receiver was
not entitled to it, nor intended to have it.352
Lord Wright of the Privy Council in a subsequent case, quoting Parke's
statement noted that the 'fact' to which Parke refers is "one 'which would
entitle the other to the money' if true.353 The reference to intention is
crucial.,, 3' According to Parke, for the payer to recover, it is essential that
the payer be legally obliged to make the payment under the mistaken fact,
and that the payer pay with an intention to discharge the legal obligation.
Future reference in this article to the element of Parke's proposition includes
the intention of the payer to discharge a legal obligation, even though it only
states that the payer is legally obliged to pay under the mistaken fact.
Gurney also concurred without writing a separate opinion. Thus, Parke,
Rolfe, and Gurney were of the opinion that the rule of recovery discussed in
Kelly contains an element that the payer is legally obliged to pay under the
mistaken fact. Abinger spent all of his time trying to correct his own
mistake made in his instruction on the question of forgotten knowledge at the
trial, consequently, he did not discuss the complete rule of recovery.
Nonetheless, Abinger, sitting with Parke, did not express any disagreement
with him. Abinger already had expressed his opinion in Harris,355 which
supported Parke's view.
Thus, a third general rule of recovery may be derived from the case of

352. Id. (emphasis added).
353. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, Ltd. v. William H. Price, Ltd., [1934] A.C. 455, 462
(P.C.) (appeal taken from New S. Wales) (Eng.) (quoting Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 26).
354. Id.
355. Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 183.
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The rule is: a payer may recover a payment which the payer
made without a consideration by mistake and which the payer was obliged
to make under the mistaken fact.
In the cases discussed so far, the payers discovered the mistake long after
the payees had actually received the money. No issue arose as to whether
the payment had occurred. It had occurred in all instances. Therefore, the
courts had no occasion to decide what constituted payment and at what
moment payment occurred. In Chambers v. Miller,357 however, the court
had an occasion to deal with the issue. Although Chambers was a tort case
for assault and false imprisonment, the holding was relevant in that it
involved an issue of when payment occurred. In this case, the plaintiff, who
was a clerk of a merchant, went to a bank, with a check drawn by a customer
upon the bank, and presented it to one of bank cashiers. The cashier
received the check, and without checking the account of the drawer, removed
the money from the till, placed it on the counter, and went away.358 The
plaintiff then counted the money once and began to count again when the
cashier, after having determined that cashing the check made the drawer
overdrawn, came back and said that the plaintiff's check could not be
paid. 35 9 The plaintiff put the money into his pocket.3" Threatening to
have him arrested for theft, the cashier refused to let him leave until he
returned the money, which he did, and then the cashier returned his
uncancelled check to him.3 6' When the check was later presented to the
drawer, it was paid. 362 The plaintiff brought the action in tort against the
bank for damages.363 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
defendants obtained a rule nisi to enter a verdict for them.36 Upon a show
of cause by the plaintiff, the Court of Common Bench, in holding for the
plaintiff unanimously, discharged the rule nisi.365 The question, as the
court put it, was "whether the money had passed to the plaintiff or still
remained the property of the defendants. ' 3 Chief Judge Erie held for the
plaintiff on the ground that the title had passed. 367 According to Erie,

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 24.
143 Eng. Rep. 50 (Q.B. 1862).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 53. He stated:

When a cheque is presented at the counter of a banker, ... [t]he money in the
banker's hands is his own money.... [T]he property in the money [passed] to the
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when the clerk "placed [the money] on the counter for the [payee] to take
up," the title to the money passed to the payee and the instrument was
paid. 368 He continued stating that the customer received money for the
check and was therefore, entitled to retain the money.3 69 Thus, the court
held that passage of the title to the money constituted payment.
In Kelly, in which the payer was allowed recovery, the rule of recovery
applied by the court was a broad one. While the rule contains the element
that the payer is obliged to pay under the mistaken fact, the court did not
specify the person to whom the payer was obliged to pay. Aiken v.
Short37 ° involved a case where the payer was obliged to a third party, but
not to the payee, to pay under the mistaken fact. In Aiken, Edwin Carter
made a will, dated February 1846, leaving his property to be divided equally
among his eight siblings, of whom George Carter was one.3 1' This will
was proved in court after Edwin Carter's death in 1847.372 George Carter,
being indebted to Short in the sum of £200, granted the latter an equitable
mortgage in the property devised to him by Edwin Carter under the February
will, to secure a joint bond of George Carter, John Carter, and Charles
Carter, dated October 1850.17 1 In 1855, being indebted to Stuckey's
Banking Company (the Bank), George Carter by deed conveyed to the Bank
his one-eighth share in the property of Edwin Carter, subject to the charges
upon it mentioned above.3 74 The equitable mortgage was recited in the
deed, and it was agreed between George Carter and the Bank that the Bank
should pay off the sum of £200 and interest.375 In May 1855, the Bank
sold the property.3 76 Before delivery of the deed, the Bank paid Short
£226, the money in dispute in this case, to pay off the bond and
mortgage.177 In August 1855, John Carter produced another will of Edwin
Carter, dated April 1846, which was proved to be the last will of Edwin
Carter.3 78 This will did not devise any interest in the property to George
Carter.379 Consequently, the Bank received no good title to the proper-

holder of the cheque... [when] the banker's clerk.., counted out the [money]
and placed [it] on the counter for the [payee] to take up.
Id.
368. Id.

369. Id.
370. 156 Eng. Rep. 1180 (Q.B. 1856).
371. Id.
372. Id.

373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.

376. Id.
377. Id.

378. Id.
379. Id.
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ty.380 It applied to Short, the mortgagee, for the refund of the £226 and
upon refusal, brought the action for money had and received to recover
money paid under a mistake of fact.381
The Bank received no valid consideration for paying off the bond. The
case, however, presented a new question. In all the cases in this third
situation discussed so far, where the payer was allowed to recover he was
legally obliged to the payee to make the payment under the mistaken fact.
Aiken is the first case in which the payer was obliged, not to the payee
(Short) but to a third person (George Carter) to pay under the mistaken fact.
The Court of Exchequer unanimously held that the Bank could not recover
the payment.382 The three judges sitting in the court were Pollock, C.B.,
Platt, B., and Bramwell, B. Although all three judges decided for the payee,
the grounds of the decisions of the judges varied.
Platt's opinion was based on the same principle applied by the court in
Moses.3 83 He stated, "The action for money had and received lies only for
money which the defendant ought to refund ex aequo et bono. . . . The
money which the defendant got from her debtor was actually due to her, and
there can be [no] obligation to refund it." 3"
Bramwell's opinion was unequivocally positivistic. His proposition
subsequently became quite controversial.385 He stated,
In order to entitle a person to recover back money. . ., the mistake
must be as to a fact which, iftrue, would make the person paying
liable to pay the money; not where, if true, it would merely make it
desirable that he should pay the money.... The mistake of fact [in
this case] was, that the Bank thought that they could sell the estate
for a better price .... [Plaintiffs] cannot, having voluntarily parted
with their money to purchase that which the defendant had to sell,
though ... it turned out to be ... of less value than what they
expected.3 86
Bramwell denied recovery because the Bank was not obliged to the
mortgagee, Short, to pay the mortgage, though it took the property subject
to the mortgage. But because the Bank agreed with George Carter to pay the
mortgage, it was obliged to George Carter to make the payment under the
mistaken fact. Bramwell did not regard the Bank's obligation to Carter as

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1181-82.
Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 676.
Aiken, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1182.
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 522 & 612.
Aiken, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1182 (emphasis added).
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an obligation which would meet the requirements in his proposition.
The proposition of Bramwell quoted above is more restrictive than the
proposition of Parke announced in Kelly in that in order for the payer to
recover under this general rule the payer is legally obliged to the payee to
make the payment under the mistaken fact, while, according to Parke, the
payer may recover as long as the payer is legally obliged to pay.388
The position of the third judge, Pollock, is less clear. He said, "The
Bank had paid the money in one sense without any consideration,but the
defendant had a perfect right to receive the money from Carter, and the
bankers paid for him. The money was, in fact, paid by the Bank, as the
agents of Carter."389 He did not state the rule which he applied. The
statement "[t]he Bank had paid the money in one sense without any
consideration" 39° referred to an element of a positivistic rule. But the
statement "the defendant had a perfect right to receive the money '39'
seemed to imply that the defendant could in justice keep the payment.392
Subsequent courts did not regard Bramwell's view to be shared by Pollock
because Bramwell's proposition was often referred to as a dictum.393
One case with facts similar to Aiken is Barclay & Co. v. Malcolm &

decided by the court of King's Bench. In Malcolm, the payer was
not obliged to the payee, but was obliged to a third person to make the
payment. 395 The defendants in London sold goods from time to time to
Warter Company (W. Co.) in Poland.396 In 1920, W. Co. owed the
defendants a substantial sum on account and instructed the Bank of Warsaw
to pay the defendants the sum of £2000. 39' The Bank of Warsaw
telegraphed instructions to the plaintiff (Barclays Bank) in London to pay the
Co., 3 94

defendants £2000.398

The plaintiff paid the entire sum to the defendants

immediately on receipt of the telegram. 3' The Bank of Warsaw then wrote
a letter to the plaintiff confirming the telegram, but the plaintiff thought it

387. See id.

388. See Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 25.
389. Aiken, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1181-82 (emphasis added).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. The rule in Moses, based on natural justice expounded by Mansfield, is broader than
Pollock's statement indicates. A payee may in justice keep the money even though he or she
has no right to the money. See supra text accompanying notes 123-31.
393. Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 97; W.J.Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 538.
394. 133 L.T.R. 512 (K.B. 1925) (Eng.).
395. Id. at 513.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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was a direction to pay the defendants an additional £2000. 4o Even after
the £4000 payment, W. Co. still was indebted to the defendants." 1 Subsequently, W. Co., which was unaware of the plaintiff's double payment,
directed the Warsaw Bank to pay the defendants another £1000.402
Although the Bank of Warsaw sent instructions to Barclays Bank to make the
payment to the defendants, the instructions were lost and never received.0 3
Upon discovering the facts, the plaintiff informed the defendants that the
second payment had been in error.404 The plaintiff was willing to credit the
defendants with the £1000 intended by W. Co. for the defendants, but
requested the return of the balance of £1000.405 Upon refusal of the
defendants to return the £1000, the plaintiff brought this action to recover the
payment. 4° Judge Roche, in holding that the payees could retain the
payment, said that "no such mistake of fact [existed] as would entitle the
plaintiffs to maintain that the money was paid to their use.'7 He
reasoned:
It is not contrary to good conscience that the defendants should be
allowed to keep the money in question. The mistake was in no way
due to them. The mistake which was made concerned only the
plaintiffs and the Warsaw Bank by whom the plaintiffs were
instructed, and it was not a mistake with regard to the liability of
one person to pay or the right of anotherperson to receive.
The nearest authority appears to be Chambers v. Miller."'

400. Id.
401. Id.

402. Id.
403. Id.

404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. (citing Chambers, 143 Eng. Rep. at 50) (emphasis added). How the holding of
Chambers would support Roche's decision is not clear. Chambers was a tort case and dealt
with the issue of passage of title, not the issue of recovery of payment made by mistake.
Chambers, 143 Eng. Rep. at 50. Judge Byles stated:
[E]ven if this had been a payment made under such a mistake of facts as would
have entitled the bankers to recover back the money from the holder of the cheque,
by an action for money had and received, I must entirely withhold my assent from
the proposition that they could justify the act of seizing the person to whom they
had voluntarily paid the money, and picking his pocket.
Id. at 54.
Deciding that the title to the money has passed does not at the same time decide that
the payer may not recover the payment made by mistake under the rules of restitution. In all
cases for recovery of money paid by mistake, title to the money has passed to the payee when
the payer reclaims the money.
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In stating that it is "not contrary to good conscience that the defendants
should be allowed to keep the money,"4' 9 Roche seems to have applied a
rule founded on natural justice, a rule the English courts had discarded long
before. On the other hand, Roche's statement in italics quoted above which
addressed to the liability of the payer to pay and his citation of Chambers as
authority indicate that he based his judgment on positivistic law. His
statement inferred that it was essential for a payer to recover that the payer
was obliged to the payee to pay under the mistake fact. Such restrictive view
echoed the view of Bramwell in Aiken,41° though Roche did not mention
the case. Roche did not explain why it was "not contrary to good
conscience'" 1 for the defendants to keep the money. The only reason
which I can think of is that W. Co. owed the defendants money. But the
second payment which the defendants received was not W. Co.'s money.
The plaintiff could not and was not allowed to debit the account of the Bank
of Warsaw for the unauthorized payment, otherwise it would not have
brought this action. So, the money which the defendants received and the
plaintiff asked to be refunded was the plaintiff's money, not W. Co.'s money
or was paid for their account. In Kleinwort, the payer, who owed its seller
of goods and intended to send the money to a creditor of its seller, sent the
money by mistake to the payee, who was another creditor of its seller.412
The House of Lords held that the payee could not retain the money.4" 3 In
this case, the payer received no consideration for the second payment, and
it was legally obliged to the Bank of Warsaw to make the payment under the
mistaken fact.41 4 Under the third rule of recovery derived from Kelly, the
payee would have to refund the money.415 Judge Goff in a subsequent case
said that "the reasoning, if not the decision, of Roche J. in Barclay v.

When sovereigns or bank notes are paid over as currency, so far as the payer is
concerned, they cease ipsofacto to be the subjects of specific title as chattels....
[C]hattels of such a kind form part of what the law recognizes as currency, and
treats as passing from hand to hand in point, not merely of possession, but of
property.
Sinclair, 11 L.T.R. at 6.
Yet, the passage of title to the money does not deprive the right of the payer to recover under
the rules of restitution. In W.J. Simms, Judge Goff said that "Chambers v. Miller... was not
concerned with recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact, but with an action for assault
and false imprisonment." [1979] 3 All E.R. at 529.
409. Id.
410. See Aiken, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1182.
411. Malcolm, 133 L.T.R. at 513.
412. Kleinwort, 97 L.T.R. at 264.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 24.
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Malcolm cannot . . . be reconciled with the decision of the House of Lords
in R.E. Jones.4 6 I will add that Malcolm was not consistent with Kelly.
In all cases discussed so far, payment was made in the form of money. The
same rules will apply if the payment is in the form of credit. 1 7
The House of Lords confirmed the positivistic rule in Kelly41 8 in R.E.
Jones Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow Ltd.419 In R.E. Jones, Bodenham obtained
from Waring & Gillow Ltd. (Waring) furniture to a value of over £ 13,000 on

hire-purchase terms, under which the down payment was to be £5000.420

When Bodenham defaulted in making the down payment, Waring repossessed
the goods.42 Bodenham then approached R.E. Jones Ltd., informing them
that he was representative of a motor manufacturing firm, International
Motors, and that his firm controlled the distribution of automobile called the
Roma. 4' Bodenham then had R.E. Jones and International Motors sign an
agency agreement in which R.E. Jones agreed to purchase a minimum of 500
Roma cars. 423 R.E. Jones further agreed that upon. execution of the
agreement, they would deposit £5000 (£10 per car) with International
Motors.424 Bodenham also informed R.E. Jones that Waring was financing
the venture and was the principal behind him. 425 Therefore, R.E. Jones
also could pay the deposit to Waring. 426 R.E. Jones then made out two
checks payable to the order of Waring, one for £2000 and one for £3000, and
gave them to Bodenham.4 27 Bodenham in turn handed them to Waring,
who received them from him in respect of his deposit under the hire-purchase
agreement. 428 Because the checks were signed only by one director,
Waring's accountant had R.E. Jones issue just one check for £5,000, duly
signed, to replace the two previous checks.429 This exchange was done in
good faith, and nothing was said about the nature of the transaction. 43" The
check for £5,000 was cashed by Waring, who then restored to Bodenham the
furniture it had seized, and "let him have some more. ' 3' Subsequently, the

416. WJ. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 534.
417. Ward, 82 L.T.R. at 262.
418. Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 24.

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 670.
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fraud came to light: there was no International Motors and no Roma car.432
Waring resumed possession of the furniture.433 Jones sued Waring in this
action to recover the sum of £5,000 as money paid under a mistake of
fact.4 34 The plaintiffs based their action on several causes of action,
including money had and received by the defendants for the use of the
plaintiffs, money paid for a consideration that had failed or money paid under
the mistake of fact.4 35 Here, although the plaintiffs thought that a 4valid
36
contract existed, one of the parties, International Motors, did not exist.
The trial judge gave a judgment for R.E. Jones but this was reversed by
the Court of Appeal.437 On appeal, the House of Lords reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, and allowed recovery.438 The five judges
of the House of Lords sitting at the appeal were unanimous in concluding
that Jones' mistake of fact was sufficient ground for recovery, although two
dissenting judges, Lord Chancellor Cave and Lord Atkinson, considered that
Waring had a defence to the claim based on the change of position.439
Because this is an important case decided by the House of Lords, it is
necessary to discuss the judges' opinions extensively. No dispute existed as
to whether the plaintiffs in this case received consideration and that the
positivistic rule applied here is one where the payer makes a payment without
a consideration. Cave noted that "Bodenham ... was commissioned by the
drawers of the cheques for £2000 and £3000 to carry them to the payees, his
mandate being coupled with the condition ... that he should hand them to
the payees as a deposit on the cars; and he failed to [do so]."' O Lord
Sumner, in describing the fact, stated, "The action is brought for the return
of the 5,000£ which the respondents got by cashing the 5,000£ cheque. The
previous cheques were incompletely signed; they were not cashed, and their
return or cancellation did not constitute any consideration for the issue of the
5,000£ cheque." 44 On the substantive rule, the decision of the House of
Lords confirmed two points. One is on the rule of recovery, and the other
On the rule of recovery, all five judges cited
is on the nature of mistake.
442
Kelly as the authority.

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 671-72.
R.E. Jones, Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd., [1925] 2 K.B. 612 (C.A.) (Eng.).

438. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671.

439. Id. at 671, 684-85.
440. Id. at 681-82 (Atkinson, J., concurring).
441. Id. at 691.
442. Id. at 689, 698 (Lord Carson stating "the principles ... are clearly stated in Kelly")
(Lord Shaw, stating "[Kelly has] remained of paramount authority as part of the law of
England") (citations omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 351-52.
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In R.E. Jones, the judges approved the proposition that a payer may
recover a payment made by mistake if the payer is obliged to pay under the
mistaken fact.443 They pointed out that the plaintiffs were legally obliged
to make the payment under the mistaken fact, and they made the payment
with intention to discharge the obligation.'" Shaw found the facts in R.E.
Jones to fit within the principle." 5 Considering it important that the payers
were legally obliged to pay under the mistaken fact, he stated "that by an
agreement which Bodenham induced [the plaintiffs] to sign they became the
purchasers of 500 of these cars, in respect of each of which a deposit of 10f
was to be made, making in all 5,000f. '' 46 Sumner then stated that the
plaintiffs paid with intention to discharge their obligation." 7 Sumner
concurred with Cave and Atkinson that the plaintiffs believed under the
mistaken fact they were bound to pay that sum under the contract signed with
International Motors.448 Carson emphasized the fact that the plaintiffs'
obligation to make the payment "goes ... to
belief that they were under an
4 49
the very root of the matter.
Undoubtedly, the House of Lords has approved as part of English law the
positivistic rule laid down in Kelly that a payer who receives no consideration
and is obliged to make the payment under the mistaken fact may recover the
payment.45 ° I must emphasize again that in the case where a payer receives
no consideration, in order to recover, the payer not only must be obliged to
pay under the mistaken fact 45but also the payer must pay under the belief that
he or she is obliged to pay. '
One important fact in this case is that Waring was not, and never had
represented itself as being an agent of International Motors. R.E. Jones was
obliged to International Motors, but not to the payee, Waring, to make the

443. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671 (citing Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 26).
444. Id. at 679-80 (Cave and Atkinson stating, "[T]here could be no doubt as to their right
to succeed on this ground. . . . Believing [the] statements [of Bodenham] to be true, the
plaintiffs entered into an agreement which bound them to pay a deposit of £5,000 on 500
As to the general principle, it is sufficient to refer to the well-known case
"Roma" cars ....
of Kelly v. Solari .. .
445. Id. at 688.
446. Id. at 685-86.
447. Id. at 691 (stating that they had "issued it to discharge their obligation, and there
[was] no obligation in fact").
448. Id. (stating, "[R. E.] Jones, would not have issued the 5,000£ cheque if they had not
thought that they were bound to deposit that sum with somebody under the contract signed
with International Motors ... and also that payment to Waring ... would discharge their
obligation in a manner that would safeguard themselves") (emphasis added).
449. Id. at 698.
450. Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 24.
451. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 686-87 (Shaw stating that "[i]t seems quite clear that [the
payers] would never have parted with their money to [the payees] if they had had any
knowledge what ever of the real truth").
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payment under the mistaken fact.452 Hence, the House of Lords in R.E.
Jones indirectly rejected the proposition of Bramwell in Aiken.453 The
proposition of Bramwell in Aiken is more restrictive than that of Parke in
Kelly. According to Bramwell, for a payer to recover a payment under this
rule, the payer had to be obliged to the payee to make the payment under the
mistaken fact. Thus, in Aiken, the bank could not recover the payment
because according to Bramwell, the bank was not obliged to the payee, Short,
to make the payment, though it was obliged to George Carter to make the
mortgage payment. In R.E. Jones, the payers were legally obliged to
International Motors, not to the payees, Waring, to pay under the mistaken
fact.4' The payers in R.E. Jones would not have been entitled to recover
if the House of Lords had adopted the proposition of Bramwell. Thus, the
House of Lords considered that the payer was legally obliged to someone to
pay under the mistaken fact, an element of the rule of recovery, where the
payer received no consideration.
It also is important to note that the element of the rule of recovery that
the payer is legally obliged to pay the payee under the mistaken fact exists
only in the third situation, where the payee receives no consideration. This
is not the case in the rules of recovery in the first and the second situations
discussed earlier.
The second point that the House of Lords confirmed in R.E. Jones is on
the nature of mistake. The Court of Appeal in holding for the defendants,
gave various reasons. For example, the plaintiffs' claim against defendants
to recover the money as paid under a mistake of fact must fail, because
the mistake was a mistake as between the plaintiffs and [Bodenham],
and not a mistake as between [the defendants] and the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs and the defendants were each of them under ...
different mistakes of fact. . . . [T]herefore, . . . it is not possible for
the plaintiffs to recover the money as having been paid under a
mistake of fact.455
In reversing the judgement of the Court of Appeal and granting recovery,
Shaw said that while the mistake was between the payers and the payees, the
payers and payees had each made different mistakes.456 The payers thought
that they had paid the money as required by the agreement, while the payees
thought that they were receiving the payment for the furniture that they had

452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

Id. at 671.
See Aiken, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1180.
R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671.
R.E. Jones, [1925] 2 K.B. at 632.
R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 685.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

53

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. I11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5

sold to Bodenham.457
Nevertheless, the House of Lords allowed
recovery.45 Therefore, it is not necessary for the payer and the payee to
have each made the same mistake in order for the payer to recover the
payment under the rules.
This third rule of recovery laid down by Kelly was also confirmed by the
Privy Council in Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society, Ltd. v. William H.
Price, Ltd.459 In Norwich, a shipment of lemons, being sent by steamship
to Australia, was insured under a marine insurance policy against sea
perils."4 ' On the way, the steamship struck a submerged object and part of
the cargo, but not the lemons, was damaged." 1 The vessel could not
continue with the delivery and made port in Gibraltar, and then part of the
cargo was transhipped. 2 The lemons were determined. to have ripened
and consequently, they were sold in Gibraltar by the shipowners, who
informed the insured. 6' Both insurers and insured concluded from the
documents sent by the shipowners that the lemons had been damaged by an
insured peril, and accordingly the insurers paid the insured on the policy as
for a total loss." The insured, by a letter in consideration of the payment
and at the insurers' request assigned, transferred, and abandoned to the
insurers all their rights to the lemons, and subrogated the insurers to all their
rights in consequence of the loss. 465
Later, the lemons were found to be undamaged, thus, negating any claim
under the policy." 6 The insurers sued the insured in this case "for the
return of the money they had paid on the policy as money paid under a
'
mistake of fact."467
The trial judge allowed the recovery."68 But the
Supreme Court of New South Wales reversed the judgment on the ground
that the letter constituted a notice of abandonment which had been accepted,
and the abandonment was, under the Australian Marine Insurance Act of
1909, irrevocable and therefore the insurers were not entitled -to
repayment. 469 On appeal, the Privy Council reversed the Supreme Court's

457. Id. at 685-86.

458. Id. at 693.
459. [1934] A.C. at 455 (P.C) (Eng.)
460. Id. at 458.
461. Id.

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 456.

Id. at 455-56 (citing 33 State Rep. N.S.W. 196 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (Austl.) (citing
Australian Marine Insurance Act, 1909, ch. 11, § 68(6))).
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judgement.4 7 °
The trial court, the Supreme Court, and the Privy Council all agreed that
the insurers made the payment under a mistake of fact and that at common
law the insurers were entitled to recover the payment.4 7 However, Lord
Wright, speaking for the Privy Council, said that there was no abandonment,
be "entitled to recover" as for a
and at common law, the insurers would
472
payment made under a mistake of fact.
Wright, quoting Chief Justice Street of the New South Wales Supreme
Court, stated that "'the payment of the insurance moneys in consideration
of the [insured's] agreement to abandon its right to its property and its
subrogation of those rights to the [insurers] was based on an underlying
assumption by both parties that the lemons had been damaged by a peril
insured against.' ,7 Wright continued, stating that "unless ... [a misconception of facts] were so, there was no liability under the policy ... and no
payment could have been claimed. 47 4 He went on to comment on the rule
in Kelly, which allowed money paid under mistake of fact to be recovered if
the payer paid under the impression that money was paid to discharge his
obligation.475
Referring to the test of intention and the nature of mistake, Wright stated:
"[Iln general the test ... is objective, that is, intention is to be ascertained
from what the parties said or did. But proof of mistake affirmatively
excludes intention ... [if] the mistake . . . [is] in respect of the underlying
assumption of the contract or transaction or as being fundamental or
basic." 76
It is clear that in this case, the insurers made the payment without
consideration.477 The insured was not entitled to the money under the
policy. So, the insurers received no consideration for the payment.478
Wright stated:
The facts which were misconceived were ... essential to liability
and were of such a nature that ...any agreement concluded under
such mistake was void in law, so that any payment made under such
mistake was recoverable. The mistake, being of the character that it

470. Id. at 455.
471. Id. at 461.
472. Id. at 466-67.

473. Id. at 461 (alteration in the original).
474. Id.
475. Kelly, [1934] All E.R. at 356 (stating, "The 'fact' refer[red] to is one 'which would
entitle the other to the money' if true. The reference to intention is crucial.").
476. Norwich Union, [1934] A.C. at 463.
477. Id. at 461.
478. Id.
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was, prevented there being that intention which the common law
regards as essential to the making of an agreement or the transfer of
money or property.47 9
By citing Kelly as authority, the Privy Council reaffirmed that the rule of
recovery where the payer receives no consideration contains an element that
the payer is legally obliged to pay under the mistaken fact and the
payers(insurers) in this case paid with intention to discharge such obligation
because they believed that they were obliged to pay.
I pointed out before that the element of the rule that the payer is legally
obliged to pay the payee under the mistaken fact also includes that the payer
believes that he is obliged to pay. When courts have discussed the intention
of the payer to discharge such obligation, the intention is based on such
belief.
In 1940, the court in Weld Blundell v. Synott4 80 again followed Kelly
and allowed the payer to recover payment made by mistake. 48 ' The payer
in this case, who made a payment without receiving a consideration by
mistake, was also obliged to make the payment under the mistaken fact.48
In Lamer v. London County Council,4 3 the question of whether the
proposition of Bramwell in Aiken was law was raised again.4
In 1939,
the London County Council, acting under statutory authority, passed a
resolution that all of their employees who were engaged in war service would
be compensated for the difference between their war service and their county
pay.485 All employees were responsible for notifying the council of any
changes in their war service pay, whereupon the council would make the
necessary deductions from future payments.4 s The Plaintiff, Lamer, an
ambulance driver employed by the council, was called up in 1942.487 As
a result of his failure to keep the council accurately informed about changes
in his war service pay, the council overpaid the difference. 488 The council

479. Id. at 461-62.
480. [1940] 2 All E.R. 580 (K.B.) (Eng.).
481. Id. The plaintiffs and the defendant were respectively first and second mortgagees
of a property. Id. The mortgager defaulted, the plaintiffs sold the property, and the remainder
of the proceeds, after deducting the principal and interest, was given to the defendant. Id.
However, because the plaintiffs miscalculated the interest due, the defendant was paid too
much. Id. The plaintiffs sought to recover the excess the money paid under a mistake of fact.

Id.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Id.
[1949] 1 All E.R. 964 (K.B.) (Eng.).
Id. at 966 (citing Aiken, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1182).
Id. at 964.
Id.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 966.
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recovered most of the overpayments to him. 8 9 After he returned to work
for the council, they started to deduct the remainder of the overpayment from
his pay.4"' Lamer brought action for the amount withheld by the council,
and they, in turn, counterclaimed for the outstanding balance of the overpayment.49 ' The county court held for the council on both the claim and
counterclaim, and the plaintiff appealed the decision.4 92
Relying on the dictum of Bramwell in Aiken v. Short, the plaintiff argued
that the payments to him were voluntary and not made in discharge of any
legal liability, and consequently, not recoverable. 3 The Court of Appeal
stated, "That dictum... cannot be regarded as an exhaustive statement of the
law."' 94 The court based its decision on the fact that the payer was obliged
to pay under the mistaken fact. It stated that the London County Council
"for good reasons of national policy, made a promise to the men which they
were in honour bound to fulfil.""95 The court continued:
The payments made under that promise were not mere gratuities.
They were made as a matter of duty. Indeed, that is how both sides
regarded them. They spoke of them ... as sums the men were
entitled to under the promise contained in the resolution. If then,
owing to a mistake of fact, the council paid one of the men more
than he was entitled to under the promise, why should he not repay
the excess, at any rate if he has not changed his position for the
worse? It is not necessary to inquire whether there was any consideration for the promise so as to enable it to be enforced in a court
of law. It may be that ... there was . . . no consideration for the
promise, but that.., is not a question here of enforcing the promise
by action. It is a question of recovering overpayment made in the
belief that they were due under the promise, but, in fact, not due.
They were sums which the council never promised the plaintiff and
which they would never havepaid him had they known the truefacts.
They were paid under a mistake of fact, and he is bound to repay
them unless he has changed his position for the worse because of
them."96
The council may not be obliged to Lamer to pay the money as the

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 101).
Id.
Id.
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Bramwell's proposition requires, but by making the resolution, it was obliged
by law to carry out its resolution. And that has met the requirement of the
proposition of Parke in Kelly and approved by the House of Lords in R.E.
Jones for the application of the rule. Therefore, the decision of the Lamer
court is consistent with that of Kelly and R.E. Jones.
A third general rule of recovery may be derived from the cases discussed
covering this third situation. The rule is: A payer may recover a payment
that the payer made without a consideration by mistake and that the payer
was obliged to pay under the mistaken fact. The mistake need not be
between the payer and the payee and need not be mutual if the mistake is
between the two. 497
Negligence is, generally, not an issue in the positivistic rule of
recovery.49 8 Parke said in Kelly, "[I]f [the money] is paid under the
impression of the truth of a fact which is untrue, it may, generally speaking,
be recovered back, however careless the party paying may have been, in
omitting to use due diligence to inquire into the fact."" In R.E. Jones,
Sergeant of the Court of Appeal, which held for the payee, stated, "'In all
these cases where the question is which of two innocent parties is to suffer,
one cannot leave out of consideration the question which of the two innocent
parties really has been guilty of carelessness or negligence or want of
ordinary care."'o
In the House of Lords, Carson, commenting on
Sergeant's statement quoted above, said,
[T]his is a consideration which I must absolutely decline to enter
upon. If I did, I would have to go into the whole circumstances of
the dealings between the [defendant] and [a third party] ....
[I]n
my opinion there could be no more futile way of attempting to
ascertain the rights of parties in an action of this kind. °
Sumner also believed that negligence on the part of the payer was irrelevant.0 2 Shaw, commenting that attempts have been made not to attack
the elementary rule laid down in Kelly, but to set up a species of estoppel by
reason of the carelessness of the person who was misled into the mistake in
fact, stated:

497. See R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671; WJ.Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 522; Weld
Blundell, [1940] 2 All E.R. at 583; Ward, 82 L.T.R. at 261.
498. As was pointed out earlier, negligence on the part of the payer is not an element of
the rule of recovery under natural law theory. See supra text accompanying note 135.
499. Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 26.
500. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 702 (quoting R.E. Jones, [1925] 2 K.B. at 645).
501. Id. at 702.
502. Id. at 693 (stating that he "d[id] not think that either party acted negligently... . The
point is probably immaterial.").
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"As regards negligence in paying the cheque: It cannot be denied that
when the Bank of Hamilton paid the cheque ...it had means of
ascertaining from its own books that the cheque had been altered.
But means of knowledge and actual knowledge are not the same; and
it was long ago decided in Kelly v. Solari that money honestly paid
by mistake of facts could be recovered back, although the person
paying it did not avail himself of means of knowledge which he
possessed."' 3
Thus, the House of Lords considered negligence on the part of the payer
irrelevant in the payer's right to recover payment on the ground of mistake.
Even if the payer made a payment without a consideration by mistake,
four exceptions exist where the law does not impute a promise to pay: where
payment is voluntary, where payment is made under an illegal transaction,
where payment is received by payee in good faith through the process of law,
and where the payer is in breach of duty. The first exception where the law
does not impute a promise to pay is where the payment is voluntary. In
Harris, Abinger referred to the plaintiffs, as well as "the friends" of the
debtor who had paid the money, as volunteers.5s° Abinger did not define
the word "volunteer," but there is little doubt that they were called volunteers
because they made voluntary payments - they made a payment which they
were not obliged to do. Two situations exist in which a payer makes a
voluntary payment. One is where the payer is not legally obliged to pay
under a mistaken fact, but pays anyway. 5
Because the third rule of
recovery contains an element that the payer is legally obliged to pay under
the mistaken fact, whether or not the payer believes that he is obliged to pay
when he makes the payment, recovery will not be granted under this rule.
In other words, this situation does not fall under the rule.
The other voluntary-payment situation is where the payer is obliged by
law to pay under the mistaken fact. The intention of the payer when he

503. Id. at 689 (quoting with approval Lord Lindley in Imperial Bank of Canada v. Bank
of Hamilton, [1903] A.C. 49, 56 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (Eng.)) (alteration in
original).
504. Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 185.
505. See, e.g., Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 26. Rolfe, in arguing for new trial, said:
I agree that [the defendant] has a right to go to the jury again, upon two grounds:
first, that the jury may possibly find that the directors had not in truth forgotten the
fact; and secondly, they may also come to the conclusion, that they had determined
that they would not expose the office to unpopularity, and would therefore pay the
money at all events.
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makes the payment is essential in this situation."l If the payer believes
that she is obliged to pay and pays with intention to discharge the obligation,
the law imputes a promise to pay. On the other hand, even if the payer is
obliged to pay but the payer believes that she is not obliged to pay when she
makes the payment, the law does not impute a promise to repay. The
payment is voluntary. One can argue that no mistake exists on the payer's
part in making the payment. Or, even though the payer is obliged to pay but
the payer pays without reference to the truth or falsehood of the fact,
meaning to waive all inquiry into it, and that the payee shall have the money
at all events, whether the fact be true or false, the payer may not recover
afterwards. The payment is voluntary.0 7 Voluntary payment creates an
exception to the general rule of recovery. Due to the belief and the intention
of the payer, the law does not impute a promise to pay.
The second exception where the law does not impute a promise to pay
is where the payment is made under an illegal transaction. The court in
Morgan applied this exception." 8 The plaintiff was a bookmaker, and the
defendant bet with him on credit.5" A clerical error by the plaintiff's clerk
led her to give the defendant credit twice over, thus causing the plaintiff to
overpay the defendant."
The plaintiff brought an action in a county court
to recover the money overpaid on the clerical mistake. " The defendant
made a counterclaim on the ground that he had won other bets and the
plaintiff owed him still more money, even after payment was received by
him."' The county court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed. 3 The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment below
on two grounds.514
The first ground was that the payment was made under a wager
transaction, which was illegal." 5 Scott stated that "[w]here the mistake
upon which a plaintiff relies, to justify a claim for money had and received

506. See Norwich Union, [1934] A.C. at 462.
507. See Kelly, 152 Eng. Rep. at 26.
If... the money is intentionally paid, without reference to the truth or falsehood
of the fact, the plaintiff meaning to waive all inquiry into it, and that the person
receiving shall have the money at all events, whether the fact be true or false, the
latter is certainly entitled to retain it.
Id.
508. Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 92.
509. Id. at 93-94.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 94.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 92.
515. Id. at 95; see The Gaming Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., ch.109, § 18 (Eng.) (making all
contracts by way of gaming or wagering null and void).
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to his use, is one that can only be ascertained by investigating betting
51 6
accounts, the court cannot lend its aid without transgressing the statute."
On the second ground, both Greene and Scott based their opinions on
positivistic law.517 Greene explicitly rejected the theory of natural justice
applied by Mansfield in Moses.5 18 According to Greene, if recovery was
granted in such a case it was because the law imputed a promise on the part
of the defendant to repay the money, not because natural justice demanded
it, while if recovery was not granted, it was because the law would not
impute a promise.5 19 Scott's opinion on the second ground was also based
on the theory of imputed promise, that is, "that a promise to repay will not
be implied in law if an actual promise would in law be void. This special
defense is, in itself, a sufficient reason for allowing the appeal. ' 520 Scott
further stated that "[t]his whole group of common law actions known as
'implied assumption' or 'implied contract' permits the redress of so many
widely different types of grievance, and thus is so useful in our jurisprudence
The implied contract for money had and received ... is implied in
....
521
law."
The two judges, however, differed on the rule of recovery. Greene
followed the proposition of Bramwell in Aiken that the rule of recovery
contained an element that the payer is legally obliged to the payee to make
Since the wager transaction
the payment under the mistaken fact.52
to
created no legal obligation on the part of the plaintiff to the defendant
52 3
make the payment, Greene said that the money was not recoverable.
In Scott's view, the rule of recovery contained no element that the payer
is obliged to pay under the mistaken fact.5 24 He not only rejected the
restrictive view of Bramwell in Aiken, but also implicitly rejected the less
restrictive proposition of Parke in Kelly.5 25 After quoting the statement of

516.
517.
518.
519.

Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 100.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 96.
Id. Greene stated:

Two propositions can, I think, be put forward with certainty. The first is that the
claim (to recover payment) cannot now be said to be based on some rule of aequum
et bonum by virtue of which a man must not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly
The second proposition is that the claim is based
at the expense of another ....
upon an imputed promise to repay.
Id.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

101.
103 (citation omitted).
99.
105.
102.
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Farwell526 and the statement of Rowlatt, which said that Kelly and Aiken
laid down the rule that "to recover under ...[a mistake of fact], there must
be a mistake of fact and a fact going to the supposed liability. 5' 27 Scott
continued,
[T]he ...statement by Rowlatt, J., remains a dictum....
In none of the above cases,.., not even in Aiken v. Short, was
there a decision of the court that the action failed simply because the
mistake did not induce a belief of liability. Indeed, in Kerrison ...
it was definitely decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover a
payment made to the defendants for the purpose of meeting an
anticipated liability, although he then knew that no actual liability
had yet attached to him. The decision of the House of Lords seems
to me conclusive that the rule as stated in Aiken v. Short cannot be
regarded as final and exhaustive in the sense that no mistake, which
does not induce in the mind of the payer a belief that payment will
discharge or reduce his liability, can ground an action for money had
and received. 28
In essence, in arguing that the rule of recovery contains no element that
the payer is obliged to pay under the mistaken fact, Scott relied on Kerrison.
He, in effect, argued that the rule of recovery could not contain the element
because in Kerrison the payer did not believe that he was obliged to pay, but
was allowed to recover. Scott argued that the common positivistic principles
would not altogether exclude the principle of unjust enrichment.129 He
stated that is was important to attempt to "find some common positive
principles upon which these causes of action called 'implied contracts' can
be said to rest, and which will not altogether exclude that of unjust
enrichment embodied."53 Seemingly, Scott said this because the door of
action for money had received would be unduly narrow under Bramwell's
proposition and that reasons existed for keeping the door open. According
to Scott, "[a]n additional reason for keeping the door open is the very
heterogenous list of causes of action which unquestionably fall within this
field of implied contracts .... [T]here is a plain principle applicable to all
those cases of payments in mistake of fact, and that is that the mistake must
'
He
be, in some aspect or another, fundamental to the transaction."5 31
seems to be saying that a mistake of paying the sum of £24 was too trivial

526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

Id. (quoting Re Bodega Co., Ltd., [1904] 1 Ch. 276, 286 (Eng.)).
Id. (quoting Maskell v. Homer, [1915] 3 K.B. 106, 108-09 (C.A.) (Eng.)).
Id. at 102-03 (citation omitted).
Id. at 104.
Id.
Id. at 105.
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to be fundamental to the transaction to grant recovery, when he concluded
that "[o]n the facts of th[e] case, there was no fundamental mistake. To pay
£24 for a betting debt is just as much, in the eye of the law, a purely
voluntary gift as a wedding present of £24: the law prevents the plaintiff
from saying that he intended anything but a present. I agree that the appeal
must be allowed. 532
Why Greene did not cite Kelly instead of Bramwell's proposition in
Aiken is not clear. Kelly laid down a less restrictive rule of recovery founded
upon imputed promise and would also support his decision. Scott was
correct in saying that the proposition of Bramwell in Aiken remained a
dictum. Had Greene cited Kelly to support his opinion, however, Scott
would not have been able to call the proposition of Parke in Kelly, confirmed
by the House of Lords in Jones, a dictum. In Kelly, the only rule applied by
the court allowing recovery was the proposition announced by Parke.
Scott reasoned that the rule of recovery could not contain the element
that the payer is obliged to pay under the mistaken fact, citing Kerrison in
support. 533 Kerrison, however, involved a different situation, as this article
has pointed out.5 34 It involved a situation where the payer made a payment
by mistake as to a payee's capability to perform a particular purpose, a fact
which Atkinson called "vital matters. 5 35 As I pointed out before, the
proposition of Parke in Kelly that in order for the payer to recover, the payer
is legally obliged to pay under the mistaken fact applies only in a situation
where the payer receives no consideration. Scott did not see the distinction
between the two situations and said that in all cases for a payer to recover
a payment by mistake, the mistake must be vital.536 Greene was correct:
[T]hese observations ... must be confined to cases where the only
mistake is as to the nature of the transaction. For example, if A.
makes a voluntary payment of money to B., under the mistaken
belief that he is C., . . . A. can recover it. BRAMWELL, B., was not
dealing with a case such as that, since he was assuming that there
was no such error in persona.5 37
Thus, the element that the payer is obliged to make the payment under the
mistaken fact does not exist in the rules for the first and the second situations
discussed earlier. In the first and the second situations, the rules of recovery

532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.

Id.
Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
See supra part III.A.2.
Kerrison I, [1911-13] All E.R. at 422.
Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 105.
Id. at 99.
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are usually consistent with the notion of unjust enrichment. 3 8 The rules
are, nevertheless, positivistic rules.
Under the rule of recovery deduced from Kelly and R.E. Jones, the result
in Morgan would be the same. In the absence of illegality, the law would
impute a promise to pay. However, due to the illegal nature of the
transaction, the law would not impute a promise to pay. The illegal
transaction created an exception to the third rule of recovery.
The third exception where the law does not impute a promise to pay is
where the payment is received by the payee in good faith through the process
of law. This exception is derived from two cases. In Marriot,the plaintiff
who paid pursuant to a judgment had paid for the goods twice and therefore
received no consideration for the second payment. 39 Yet, the court
unanimously held that the money received by the defendant through the
process of law could not be recovered. 50 The case, however, did not
involve payment by mistake. A case which did involve payment by mistake
is Ward & Co. v. Wallis.5 41 The defendant, a builder, was retained to erect
a building and hired the plaintiff to supply certain floorings.542 On
completion, the plaintiff obtained a certificate from the architect of the
amount due to him for the flooring, but was unable to get payment from the
defendant. 43 Consequently, the plaintiff issued a writ against the defendant, but in error gave the defendant credit for partial payment, leaving an
inaccurate balance due. 5 " The writ was served, and the defendant paid the
balance shown due, obtaining a receipt that showed the whole of his account
as paid.5 45 Later, the plaintiff discovered the credit error and brought this
action to recover the sum credited in error, and alternatively, to recover that
sum as money had and received. 5' Although the defendant did not give
testimony, the court concluded that he was aware that he was credited in
error at the time he made his payment."
Holding for the plaintiff, Judge Kennedy said that a settlement had
existed "in the sense that the defendant had satisfied a claim in the terms of
a legal process demanding payment," and that the case was governed by the

538. Fibrosa, [1942] 2 All E.R. at 122, 137 (stating that "the common law still employs
the action for money had and received as a practical and useful, if not complete or ideally
perfect, instrument to prevent unjust enrichment, aided by the various methods of technical
equity which are also available, as they were found to be in Sinclair v. Brougham").
539. Marriot, 101 Eng. Rep. at 969.
540. Id.
541. Ward, 82 L.T.R. at 261.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 261-62.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5

64

PAYMENT BY MISTAKE

1996]

Chiang: Payment by Mistake in English Law

principle founded in Marriotthat "a settlement of a claim made under legal
process cannot be reopened."' 8
Kennedy stated that as a general rule, barring special circumstances, a
plaintiff cannot bring a new action for work and labor done, or for "money
had and received to his use." 549 He clarified special circumstances:
[T]he principle that money paid under process of law is not
recoverable does not apply if there is an absence of bonafides on the
part of the person enforcing the legal process, [or where a] settlement
under legal process is not solely because of the mistake of fact on
the part of the plaintiff in crediting the defendant with a payment
which he had never made, but where.. . the defendant [also] knows
at the time that the mistake had been made.55 0
The Ward court held that when the defendant was served with the first writ,
he knew that he had been credited in error for partial payment. 5 ' It thus
concluded that "[a]lthough the settlement was made under legal process, it
was not bona fide," and the rule of Marriot did not apply.5 2 Yet, the
general rule of recovery would not have applied if the defendant in Marriot
had received the credit in good faith through the process of law. 5 3 Thus,
the third rule of recovery is subject to an exception that the money is
received by the payee in good faith through the process of law.
The fourth exception where the law does not impute a promise to pay is
where the payer is in breach of duty. The first case laying down this
exception is Skyring v. Greenwood.M The widow of an army officer,
Major Skyring, sued the army paymasters as administratrix for the balance
of money in his account in assumpsit for money had and received by the
paymasters. In 1806, during the lifetime of Major Skyring, an order had
been issued to increase the pay of army officers except officers in his
situation. The paymasters, however, credited his account for allowances as
548. Id. at 262 (stating that this was true, although Marriot is the converse of the present
case).
In Moore v. Vestry of Fulham, it was attempted to be argued that Marriot v.

Hampton was decided on the ground of res judicata; but that is not so, the ground
of the decision being that it was in the interests of public policy that there should
be an end to litigation after a recovery by process of law.
Id. (citation omitted).
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id.

552.
for the
553.
554.

Id. In Marriot, the plaintiff received no consideration for making a second payment
goods under process of law.
Id.
107 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B. 1825).
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if he were entitled to a raise under the order. In 1816, the Board of
Ordnance instructed the paymasters that they would not allow any increase
payments to officers having the rank and appointment which Skyring had,
and that the increase of pay for him was not warranted by the order of 1806.
The paymasters never informed him of the instruction received from the
Board of Ordnance until 1821, having in the meantime given him credit for
the allowances. In the action before the court of King's Bench by the
plaintiff for the balance in his account, the paymasters claimed a right to
retain the amount on the ground of mistaken payment.
That the paymasters gave credit to Skyring without a consideration is
clear. And the paymasters were obliged to give credit to the payee under the
mistaken fact. At the trial before Chief Judge Abbot, a verdict was found for
the plaintiff. A rule nisi was obtained by the defendants and the plaintiff
showed cause. The court unanimously held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover and the defendants could not reclaim the credit given by mistake.
Abbot said,
[T]he defendants have not merely made an error in account, but they
have been guilty of a breach of duty, by not communicating to [the
payee] the instruction they received from the Board of Ordnance in
1816; . . . therefore, ... justice requires that they shall not be
permitted either to recover back or retain by way of set-off the
money which they had once allowed him in account.555
Judge Bayley, in concurring, also said that the payers were "guilty of a
neglect of duty in not communicating to [the payee] the information they had
received from the Board of Ordnance.""' 6 Judge Holroyd said that since
"the deceased was not informed [of the Board of Ordnance's communication
to the defendant] till 1821 [,] . . . Skyring had a right to expect that money
belonging to him would be received by defendants for him, and that all
payments made by them were on account of moneys so received by
'
The duty which the court referred to is a statutory duty.
them."557
The Court of Appeal confirmed the rule of Skyring in Deutsche Bank v.
Beriro.55 In this case, a Moroccan businessman endorsed a foreign bill of
exchange that had been endorsed to him and sent it to the defendants for
collection.559 The defendants, signing it over to the plaintiffs, sent it to the
plaintiffs, and requested that they should be "specially advised of its

555.
556.
557.
558.
559.

Id. at 1067 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
[1895] 73 L.T.R. 669 (C.A. Q.B. Div.) (Eng.).
Id.
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payment." 5' 6 Also requesting advice of payment, the plaintiffs sent it to
their agent in Belgium. 6 m When the bill became due, the defendants asked
the plaintiffs if the bill had been paid, and the plaintiffs, who did not check
with their agent, replied that it had and immediately .sent the defendants a
check for the amount of the bill, less commission."6
Consequently, the
defendants informed their customer in Morocco and credited him with the
amount of the bill. 63 Later, the plaintiffs' agent told the plaintiffs that the
bill had not been paid, and the plaintiffs informed the defendants, demanding
repayment. 5 4 When the defendants refused to pay, the plaintiffs brought
the action for the refund on the bill of exchange and for money paid under
a mistake of fact. 5 At trial in the Queens Bench Division, Judge Mathew
gave judgment for the defendants."6 Citing Skyring in support of his
decision, he said,
[T]he plaintiffs, by... mistake ...were guilty of a breach of duty
towards the defendants. They failed to inform [the defendants]
accurately.... [Then] they handed them the money. Upon what
ground of law or of equity can they say that they can get rid of the
consequences of their breach of duty because they had made a
mistake? I am not aware of any such principle. 67
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the duty to which
Mathew referred was a contractual duty." Asquith, in Weld, said, "When
the decisions as to estoppel in connection with payment of money under a
mistake of fact are closely examined, much seems to turn on whether the
payer was subject to a duty as against the payee to inform him of the true
state of the account, which is in effect a duty not to make a mistake of fact
in that regard." 69 Skyring was likewise indirectly approved by Lord
Sumner in R.E. Jones.'"°

560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

Id. at 670.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 670-71.
Id. at 671.
Weld, [1940] 2 All E.R. at 585 (citing Skyring, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1064).
R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 697. Distinguishing R.E. Jones and Skyring, Lord Sumner

stated: "[I]n Skyring v. Greenwood, the payers are under an obligation to inform the payee
of the true state of his account and, disregarding this obligation, pay him more than he was
entitled to. The payment is then at their risk and they must stand by it." Id. (citation
omitted).
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From these cases, one rule can be deduced. The rule is, where the payer
is in breach of duty to the payee in making a payment, the payer may not
recover the payment on the ground of mistake even though the payer
received no consideration for it.
Thus far, then, we have seen three situations in which the English courts
allowed recovery on the theory that the law imputes a promise to refund the
money when the payer pays by mistake. Where the exceptions to the rules
of recovery apply, the law does not impute a promise to repay.
B.

Payee Defense: Change of Position

In the early case of Buller, Mansfield stated, "[I]f an agent pays over
money which has been paid to him by mistake, he does no wrong; and the
plaintiff must call on the principal." 57' In this case, the payee has changed
his position with prejudice. But Mansfield concluded that under those
circumstances, the defendant would have no defense in point of law. 72
The defense to which Mansfield referred is the defense of change of position.
Thus, the right of a payer to recover the payment under general rules of
recovery is subject to a defense of the payee, that is, a change of position.
The defense is that the payee, in reliance on the payment, changed the
position with prejudice. In such a situation, while the law imputes a promise
for the payee to refund, the payee has a defense and the payer may not
recover.
5 73
This defense is recognized in all three situations discussed above.
In Colonial Bank, in which the Privy Council applied the first rule of
recovery, the court recognized such a defense.574 In Kleinwort, in which
the House of Lords allowed recovery, the payer succeeded in recovery only
because the jury decided that the payee was not led by the payer's mistake
to change his position toward his debtor to his disadvantage. 5 Loreburn,
in expressing his opinion, said, "[I]t is indisputable that, if money is paid
under a mistake of fact and is redemanded from the person who received it
before his position has been altered to his disadvantage, the money must be

571. Buller, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1244-45.
572. Id. at 1245 (emphasis added).

573. These three situations are as follows: where a payor makes a payment to another
person whom the payer does not intend to have any interest in the payment; where a payer
makes a payment to another person for a particular purpose and the other person cannot carry
out the intended purpose; and where a payer makes a payment without a consideration.
574. Colonial Bank, 11 A.C. at 84. The court said, "[The payees] had not in any way
altered their position. They would not, if they had cancelled the entries, have been in any way
damnified by the mistaken payment made to them. ...
[T]he agent of the [payees], ....
endeavours to sh[o]w that their position would have been altered for the worse by the mistake,
but he gives a reason which to their Lordships is wholly unintelligible." Id. at 89-90.
575. Kleinwort, 97 L.T.R. at 264-65; see supra text accompanying note 218.
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repaid in whatever character it was received. '57 6 Atkinson said,
Many authorities.., are [simply] applications of the broad principle
laid down by Lord Mansfield, C.J. in Bu[ljler v. Harrison. They...
establish that ... the defendant in an action brought to recover
money paid to him under a mistake of fact ...will be liable to
refund it if it be established that he dealt as a principal with the
person who paid it to him. Whether he would be liable if he dealt
as agent with such a person will depend upon this, whether, before
the mistake was discovered, he had paid over the money ...to the
principal, or settled such an account with the principal as amounts to
payment, or did something which so prejudiced his position that it
would be inequitable to require him to refund.577
Mersey in Kerrison, a case in which the House of Lords applied the
second rule of recovery discussed above, stated,
If, indeed, the [payee] has paid over the money to his customer, or
has altered his position in relation to his customer to his own
detriment, on the faith of the payment, the [payee] may refuse to
who has paid him to
repay the amount and may leave the person
57 8
customer.
the
against
remedy
his
enforce
The defense of change of position was extensively discussed by the
House of Lords in R.E. Jones in which the court applied the third rule of
recovery.57 9 Both majority and dissenting judges recognized such a
defense, except that the majority decided that the defense did not apply.5 80
Cave said, "[W]here a person to whom money has been paid ... has acted
to his own detriment, the payer cannot in law - as surely he cannot in
fairness - insist on repayment. 58'
Thus, the defense of change of position is recognized in all three
situations under which the payer may recover the payment. The most

576. Kleinwort, 97 L.T.R. at 264.
577. Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
578. Kerrison 1, [1911-13] All E.R. at 424. He further stated:
But the circumstances here are that [Glyn] had in no way altered their position when
they were asked to refund the money. They held money which they ought not to
retain because it had been paid to them under a mistake of fact, and, in the words
of the Lord Chancellor, it does not matter in what character it was received by them.

Id.
579. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671.
580. Id. at 683.
581. Id.
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common situation where the defense applies is where the payee, as an agent,
has, prior to payer's reclaim, paid it over to the principal 8 2 Once the
payee, as an agent, pays the principal the money received from the payer,
there is no question that the payee in reliance on the payment has changed
the position to the payee's disadvantage - the payee will incur a loss if the
payee is required to repay the money.1 3 Where a payee received a
payment as principal, not as an agent, change of position also is a defense for
the payee if the requisite conditions exist.
One requirement for the defense of change of position is that the payee
has changed the position to the payee's prejudice or disadvantage. That is,
the payee has done some act that the payee will sustain a loss if the payee
is required to return the payment. Where a payee, as agent, turns the payment
over to the principal and receives no new consideration for it, the payee has
changed his or her position to its disadvantage. That is, if the payee is
required to return the payment, the payee will sustain a loss."8 When the
payee has simply expended the money on his or her own purposes and has
done nothing more, the payee will sustain no loss if he or she is required to
return the payment.5 85 In Lamer, Larner argued that the London County
Council should not be allowed to recover the money because he spent the
money on living expenses - or his wife spent it for him - and he spent it
in a way which he would not otherwise have done. 58 The court rebutted:
[T]he fact that the recipient has spent the money beyond recall is no
defen[s]e unless there was some fault ... on the part of the
paymaster and none on the part of the recipient. . . . But if the
recipient was himself at fault and the paymaster was not - as, for
instance, if the mistake was due to an innocent misrepresentation or
a breach of duty by the recipient - he clearly
cannot escape liability
587
by saying that he has spent the money.
One may say that in such a case, the payee received a new consideration for
the money that he spent. Therefore, no loss is incurred if the payee is
required to return the payment. Thus, the terms "change of position to his
disadvantage" or "change of position with prejudice" in the rule of change
of position refer to the loss of money or a commitment by the payee without

582. Holland v. Russell, 121 Eng. Rep. 773 (Q.B. 1861); Cox v. Prentice, 105 Eng. Rep.
641 (K.B. 1815); Pollard v. The Bank of England, [1871] 6 L.R. 623 (Q.B.).
583. The recourse of the payor is only against payee's principal.
584. Beriro, 73 L.T.R. at 669.
585. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 684.
586. Lamer, [1949] 1 All E.R. at 964; see supra text accompanying notes 483-96.
587. Lamer, [1949] 1 All E.R. at 967.
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receiving a new consideration. 8 In Buller, the agent applied the money
which he received from the payer to the payment of debt which his principal
owed him and kept the money.s 9 Thus, the agent received a consideration
for applying the payment to the debt, and repayment of the money to the
payer would not cause any actual loss to the agent."l When Mansfield
said in Buller, "In this case, there was no new credit, no acceptance of new
bills, no fresh goods bought or money advanced,"591 he meant that the
agent had not done any of the acts for which he did not receive a new
consideration.
A second requirement for the defense to apply is that the payee changed
the position in reliance on the payment. In Buller, Mansfield said, "If there
had been any new credit given [by the payee], it would have been proper to
have left it to the-jury to say, whether any prejudice had happened to the
[payee] by means of this payment."5 9 Likewise, in Kleinwort, to the
payees' assertion that "they would not have continued... to make advances
to Kramrisch and Co. if it had not been for this payment [by the payer]," the
House of Lords, holding that the defense of change of position did not apply,
said "the jury ... thought that the payees would have acted in exactly the
same way if no payment had been made by the payee at all."' 93 In R.E.
Jones, in response to an argument for the payee that the payer was prevented
from recovery by his own conduct on which the payee acted to his
disadvantage from claiming repayment, Carson said that he could not
understand "how any conduct can be imputed to the [payers] which can be
said to have led to an alteration in the position of the [payee]."" Thus,
in order for the defense to apply, the payee must have relied on the payment
9
to change its position. .
A third requirement of this defense is that the payee acted in good
faith."9 This requisite is derived from the statements of courts. In Lamer,
the court said that if the payee "was himself at fault," as if the mistake was
due to a misrepresentation or a breach of duty by the payee, "he clearly

588. In Weld, the court said that by paying off the sum which the payee had guaranteed
and which he had to have paid off sooner or later, the payee incurred no net detriment. Weld,
[1940] 2 All E.R. at 585.
589. Buller, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1243.
590. Id. at 1243-44.

591. Id. at 1245.

592. Id.

593. Kleinwort, 97 L.T.R. at 264.
594. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 701.
595. Id.; see also Weld, [1940] 2 All E.R. at 584.

596. Reliance by the payee in changing the position implies that the payee changed the
position in good faith. Therefore, the requirement of reliance also implies that for the defense
to apply, the payee acted in good faith. I simply make it an express requirement.
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cannot escape liability" to refund.597 In R.E. Jones, Cave stated the wellknown dictum of Justice Ashhurst: "'[W]herever one of the two innocent
persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third
person to occasion the loss must sustain it.' 59 Thus, even Cave, who was
of opinion that the payees in that case changed their position, considered a
requisite for the defense that the payee was innocent. To be in good faith the
payee must, at minimum, have no notice that the payer made the payment by
mistake, both at the time of receiving the payment and the time of change of
position. Such a conclusion is also consistent with the rule in Price.'"
Thus, a rule of defense of change of position may be deduced from the
cases discussed above. The rule is: the payee has the defense of change of
position if, (1) the payee has changed the position to his or her disadvantage
- the payee will sustain a loss if he or she is required to return the money;
(2) the payee, in reliance on the payment, changed the position; and (3) the
payee acted in good faith at all times.
From the cases which I have discussed thus far, the following rules of
recovery of payment made by mistake developed by the English courts may
be deduced:
Rule 1. A payer may recover a payment which the payer made by
mistake to the payee whom the payer did not intend to have any interest in
the payment.
Rule 2. A payer may recover a payment which the payer made by
mistake as to the payee's capability to deliver the payment for a particular
purpose.
Rule 3. A payer may recover a payment which the payer made without
any consideration by mistake and which the payer was obliged to make under
the mistaken fact. To this rule of recovery there are four exceptions under
which the payer may not recover. The exceptions are (1) where the payment
was voluntary, (2) where the payment was made pursuant to an illegal
transaction, (3) where the money was received by the payee in good faith
through the process of law, and (4) where the payer was in breach of duty.
Even though the payer may recover the payment under these rules, the
payee has a defense if the payee, in reliance on the payment, changed the
position with prejudice.

597. Lamer, [1949] 1 All E.R. at 967; see supra text accompanying note 483.
598. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 683 (quoting Lickbarrow v. Mason, 100 Eng. Rep. 35

(K.B. 1787)).
599. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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IV. RULES OF RECOVERY IN BARCLAYS BANK V. W.J. SIMMS SON &
COOKE LTD.

In 1979, the court of Queen's Bench in deciding the case WJ. Simms
announced certain principles of recovery.6m Although the case was for the
recovery of payment on a negotiable instrument, I would like to discuss the
case with the view that the court announced a set of general principles of
law. In this case, the Royal British Legion Housing Association Ltd. (the
Association), which was a customer of Barclays Bank Ltd. (Barclays), drew
a check on its account at a branch payable to W.J. Simms Son & Cooke Ltd.
(W.J. Simms), a building company, in payment of an interim certificate.6'
On the following day, a creditor of Simms appointed a receiver of its
property and assets pursuant to a mortgage agreement. The next day, the
Association, upon learning the appointment of the receiver, instructed
Barclays to stop payment on the check.' The receiver received the check
by mail and deposited it at a branch of National Westminster Bank for
clearance. 6° ' Neither W.J. Simms nor the receiver was aware of the stop
payment order at the time of deposit.' Later, the check was presented for
payment and was paid by Barclays due to a mistake by the paying official
at the branch who overlooked the stop payment instruction.6°5 Barclays
demanded the return of the payment.'
Upon refusal of the receiver to
repay, Barclays commenced the action claiming repayment °7from W.J. Simms
and the receiver as moneys paid under a mistake of fact.
Judge Goff, sitting at the Queen's Bench, allowed Barclays to recover the
payment from W.J. Simms.' ° In reaching his conclusion, he reviewed a
line of cases from which he deduced two principles of recovery.
1. If a person pays money to another under a mistake of fact which
causes him to make the payment, he is prima facie entitled to recover
it as money paid under a mistake of fact.
2. His claim may however fail if: (a) the payer intends that the payee
shall have the money at all events, whether the fact be true or false,
or is deemed in law so to intend; (b) the payment is made for good
consideration, in particular if the money is paid to discharge, and
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.

W.J. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 523.
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does discharge, a debt owed to the payee (or a principal on whose
behalf he is authorized to receive the payment) by the payer or by a
third party by whom he is authorized to discharge the debt; (c) or the
payee has changed
his position in good faith, or is deemed in law to
°
have done so.6
To these propositions, Judge Goff added the following footnotes:
(a) Proposition 1. This is founded on the speeches in [Kleinwort, Kerrison and R.E. Jones] in the House of Lords ....
Of
course, if the money was due under a contract between the payer and
the payee, there can be no recovery on this ground unless the
contract itself is held void for mistake ...or is rescinded by the
plaintiff.
(b) Proposition2(a). This is founded on the dictum of Parke B
in Kelly v Solari. I have felt it necessary to add the words "or is
deemed in law so to intend" to accommodate the decision of the
Court of Appeal in Morgan v Ashcroft....
(c) Proposition 2(b). This is founded on the decision in Aiken
v Short, and on dicta in Kerrison'scase. However, even if the payee
has given consideration for the payment, ... that transaction may
itself be set aside (and so provide no defence to the claim) if the
payer's mistake was induced by the payee, or possibly even where
the payee, being aware of the payer's mistake, did not receive the
money in good faith.
(e) I have ignored, in stating the principle of recovery, defences
of general application in the law of restitution, for example where
public policy precludes restitution.
(f) The following [proposition is] inconsistent with the simple
principle of recovery established in the authorities: (i) that to ground
recovery, the mistake must have induced the payer to believe that he
was liable to pay the money to the payee or his principal ....
In reaching his conclusion, Goff favored the position of Scott and
rejected that of Greene in Morgan. He stated:
Scott LJ [in Morgan] . .. concluded that his citations emphasised
"the importance of trying to find some common positive principles
upon which these cause of action called 'implied contracts' can be
said to rest, and which will not altogether exclude that of unjust
609. Id. at 535.
610. Id. at 535-36 (citations omitted).
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enrichment embodied in those citations." . . . Scott['s] approach
ha[d] been amply vindicated by ... authoritative statements of
principle in the House of Lords by Lord Atkin in United Australia
Ltd v Barclays Banks Ltd and by Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka
Akcyjna v FairbairnLawson Combe BarbourLtd.6 1'
Goff said that Greene adopted the dictum of Bramwell in Aiken, and that the
ratio decidendi in Morgan is not be found in the passage from Greene's
judgment.6 12 Judge Goff concluded:
In the light of the above principles, it is plain that in the present case
Barclays are entitled to succeed in their claim. First, it is clear that
the mistake of the bank, in overlooking the drawer's instruction to
stop payment of the cheque, caused the bank to pay the cheque.
Second,... the payment was not effective to discharge the drawer's
obligation on the cheque; from this it follows that the payee gave no
consideration for the payment, and the claim cannot be defeated on
that ground. Third, there is no ...actual change of position on the
part of either of the defendants or on the part of National
Westminster; and.., the payee is not deemed to have changed his
position ....613
I will not discuss the second and the third grounds supporting his
conclusion. Those two grounds involve issues relating to negotiable
instruments with which this article does not deal. Judge Goff's first ground
supporting his conclusion is that the mistake which caused the bank to pay
provided a factual basis for the bank to recover under principles of law
announced by him. 614 I wish to make a few comments on this statement
and the principles of law announced by Judge Goff, including his footnotes
to the principles.
First, Judge Goff's principles of recovery are based on the theory of
imputed promise. None of Goff's propositions contain ex aequo et bono or
natural justice as an element. It is fair to conclude that the Propositions are
not based on the theory of natural justice but were based upon positivistic
laws founded on the theory of imputed promise announced by the House of
Lords in Sinclair.615 In 1940, the House of Lords still upheld the theory

611. Id. at 537 (citations omitted) (quoting Morgan, 3 All E.R. at 104).
612. Id. at 538.
613. Id. at 542.
614. Id. at 523.
615. Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 17. In support of his conclusion, Judge Goff cited United
Australia, [1940] 4 All E.R. at 20, which confirmed the theory of imputed promise. WJ.
Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 537.
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of imputed promise as the foundation of the rules.6 16 Since then no case
has been found in which the House of Lords has repealed the theory.
Although Judge Goff stated that Scott's conclusion that "[c]ommon positive
principles... will not altogether exclude that of unjust enrichment" has been
amply vindicated by subsequent development in the law,617 Goff did not
suggest or indicate that he would reject the theory of imputed promise. As
has been pointed out, the rules of recovery applied in the first and the second
situations are often in accord with the notion of natural justice. But the rules
are nevertheless rules of positivistic law.
My second comment regards his first proposition, which states: "If a
person pays money to another under a mistake of fact which causes him to
make the payment, he is prima facie entitled to recover it as money paid
under a mistake of fact., 61 8 According to Goff, once it is concluded that
mistake caused the payer to pay, the payer may prima facie recover the
payment unless an exception applies. 61'9 He founded this proposition on the
speeches of judges in Kleinwort, Kerrison, and R.E. Jones before the House
of Lords.62 °
In my opinion, Goff's first proposition is too broad and not supported by
the three cases cited by Goff or by any other precedents. This conclusion is
based on three reasons. First, as I have analyzed, each of the three cases
cited by Goff involved a different situation. In Kleinwort, the payer
delivered the money to another person whom the payer did not intend to
have any interest in the money.6 2 1 In Kerrison, the payer delivered the
money to another person for a particular purpose and the other person could
not carry out the intended purpose.6 22 And in R.E. Jones, the payer
received no consideration for the payment. 2 3 Thus, of the three House of
Lords cases cited by Goff in support, the first two involved specific mistakes
of fact, which Atkinson called vital matters,624 and the third one involved,

616. In United Australia, the plaintiff was the payee of a check that was converted by M.
and collected by the defendant bank. [1940] 4 All E.R. at 20. The plaintiff first sued M.,
either as money lent or money had and received to the use of the plaintiff, but discontinued
that action. Id. He afterwards brought the action against the defendant bank for conversion.
Id. The House of Lords, in granting the recovery, stated, "The action of indebitatus
assumpsit for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff in the cases ...enumerated
was therefore supported by the imputation by the Court to the defendant of a promise to
repay." Id. at 36.
617. WJ. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 537.
618. Id. at 535.
619. Id. at 523.
620. Id. (citations omitted).
621. Kleinwort, 97 L.T.R. at 263.
622. Kerrison I, [1911-13] All E.R. at 417.
623. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671.
624. Kerrison I, [1911-13] All E.R. at 422; see supra text accompanying note 302.
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in addition to the mistake of a fact, a specific fact that the payer received no
consideration. The payers in these cases were allowed to recover not simply
because the mistake caused the payers to pay. Only in limited situationswas
the payer allowed to recover. It is difficult to see that the three cases support
the broad Proposition 1 suggested by Goff.
Second, in an action for money had and received, if the payer is obliged
to return the money, it is - by the authorities discussed earlier - because
the law imputes a promise on the part of the payee to a refund. In 1937,
Greene in Morgan, a case mentioned by Goff, said that the law would not in
all circumstances "impute a promise to repay where the payment was made
under a mistake." 625 In fact, the House of Lords so far has confirmed only
three situations where the law imputes a promise to return the money.
Exceptions and defenses to the rules of recovery arising out of these three
situations exist under which recovery can be denied. If the law imputes a
promise to pay where the payment is made under a mistake only in a few
situations, it is not accurate to say, at least in law, that recovery is the general
rule while denial is an exception, as Proposition 1 indicates. It is then logical
to say, at least in law, that unless the court finds in limited situations that the
law imputes a promise to repay, recovery will not be allowed. Since the
theory on which recovery is based is imputed promise, as announced in
62 6
Goff's broad proposition is tantamount to saying that in
Sinclair,
virtually all cases, with only a handful of exceptions suggested by him, the
law imputes a promise on the part of the payee to repay. Such a general
statement is not supported by, and not consistent with, the authorities
discussed.
Third, Goff in deducing Proposition 1 relied on the statements of
Atkinson, Shaw, and Mersey in Kerrison.627 He said that Kerrison was "of
interest because of statements of their Lordships relating to the type of
mistake which will ground recovery., 628 Goff concluded that "provided the
plaintiff's mistake is 'vital' or 'material',. . . that [is,] the mistake caused the
plaintiff to pay the money, the money is prima facie recoverable; but ... if
the payment discharged an existing debt owing to the payee, it is irrecoverable."629
The statements of Atkinson, Shaw, and Mersey in Kerrison are not as
broad as Judge Goff suggested. Shaw stated, "The money was paid ...
under the mistake in fact, which was material,. . . that Kessler could perform

625. Morgan, [1937] 3 All E.R. at 96.
626. Sinclair, 111 L.T.R. at 1.
627. W.J. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 532.
628. Id.
629. Id. (stating that this was consistent with Aiken, although not with Bramwell's dictum)
(citation omitted).
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their obligations. 63 ° Mersey stated, "[Kerrison] paid the money in the
mistaken belief that Kessler & Co. were in a position to apply his money to
the purpose for which it was intended. Kessler & Co. were not in fact in a
position to do this .... If Kerrison had known these facts, undoubtedly he
would not have paid the money ... ."631 And Atkinson stated, that "on
general principles, [Kerrison] would be entitled to recover money paid in
ignorance of these vital matters. 632 In reaching their decisions, they had
in mind the specific fact that Kerrison delivered the money to Kessler for a
particular purpose, but Kessler could not carry out the intended purpose.
Thus, it is difficult to see how Proposition 1 is supported by the decisions of
the House of Lords.
My third comment regards Goff's footnote (f)(i), which states, "The
following proposition[] [is] inconsistent with the simple principle of recovery
established in the authorities: ...that to ground recovery, the mistake must
have induced the payer to believe that he was liable to pay the money to the
11633
payee or his principal ....
In discussing Kelly, Goff said, "[I]t would not.., be right to infer that
Parke B. was stating that money paid under a mistake of fact was only
recoverable in cases where the [payer's] mistake led him to believe that he
was under a liability to the [payee] to pay the money to him. 634 Goff was
correct in saying so because the proposition quoted above was the proposition
of Bramwell in Aiken, not of Parke in Kelly. Parke's position is less
restrictive than Bramwell's. Goff also was correct in saying that Bramwell's
proposition, which was relied on by Greene in Morgan, was a dictum and
remained a dictum. 635 The judgment
of the House of Lords in R.E. Jones
636
confirmed that it was not law.
Footnote (f)(i) refers to the proposition that to ground recovery, the
mistake must have induced the payer to believe that he was liable to pay the
money to the payee or his principal. The proposition is that of Parke in
Kelly. Goff said that the proposition [of Parke] is inconsistent with the
simple principle of recovery established in the authorities, 637 notwithstanding the fact that Parke's proposition was confirmed by the House of Lords
in R.E. Jones.638 Carson in R.E. Jones, having quoted the statements of
Parke and Rolfe in Kelly, said, "I do not think that there is any authority

630.
631.
632.
633.

Kerrison I, [1911-13] All E.R. at 423.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 422.
W.J.Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 536.

634. Id. at 528.
635. Id. at 532.
636. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671.
637. W.J. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 536.
638. R.E. Jones, [1926] A.C. at 671.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/5

78

1996]

PAYMENT BY MISTAKE

Chiang: Payment by Mistake in English Law

which modifies th[ose] clear and concise statement[s]. ' 63 9
Goff also concluded that Kerrison was inconsistent with the proposition
of Parke. 640 It must be emphasized again that the element in the rule of
recovery that the payer is obliged to pay under the mistaken fact is found
only in the rule arising out of the third situation discussed herein - where
the payer received no consideration for the payment. Kerrison was not such
a case. It falls under the second situation - where a payer delivered the
money to another person for a particular purpose and the other person could
not carry out the intended purpose. The rule of recovery applied in the
second situation, like the rule applied in the first situation, does not contain
the element that the payer is obliged to pay under the mistaken fact. Since
the element is not required in the rule applicable to Kerrison, the proposition
of Parke and Kerrison are consistent. Judge Goff's statement in footnote (f)(i)
is not supported by the authorities.
I would like to end the discussion of W.J. Simms by this. All I have said
of the principles announced by Judge Goff is that the cases do not support
some of his conclusions. I have not the slightest doubt that Judge Goff,
sitting at Queen's bench, had authority to create a set of principles which all
English courts may follow. 641
V.

CONCLUSION

The rule founded upon the theory of natural justice and equity is simple.
The test is whether the payee may in justice keep the money. The
positivistic rules of recovery, developed by English courts during the past
two centuries, founded upon the theory of imputed promise are more precise
in nature, but more complex and at the same time more confusing. By
analyzing the cases and classifying them based on factual situations, I have
been able to deduce a set of positivistic rules of recovery.
The rules are founded on the theory of imputed promise and are quasicontractual in nature. Rules one and two are often consistent with the notion
of natural justice. Nevertheless, they are statements of positivistic law. The
third rule may not be consistent with natural justice, since the law may not
impute a promise to pay under the situation.
Judge Goff said that in order to recover payment made by mistake, it was

639. Id. at 698.
640. W.J. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. at 532.
641. In two more recent cases, Lipkin Gorman v. KarpnaleLtd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (Eng.),
and Woolwich Equitable Building Soc 'y v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1993] A.C. 70
(Eng.), neither of which involved payment by mistake of fact, the House of Lords, with J.

Goff, now Lord Goff, sitting, recognized unjust enrichment as a factor for recovery in actions
for money had and received. It would be interesting to see the future development of the
English law of restitution, particularly the law of payment by mistake.
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not necessary that the mistake had induced the payer to believe that he was
liable to pay the money to the payee or his principal. This statement is
correct in situations where a payer makes a payment to another person whom
the payer does not intend to have any interest in the payment and in
situations where a payer makes a payment to another person for a particular
purpose and the other person cannot carry out the intended purpose. But, his
statement is not supported by precedents in situations where a payer makes
the payment without a consideration by mistake.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Morgan Guaranty applied the
New York law of restitution, which is in accord with the rule laid down in
Price. But the court instead of asking, as the Mansfield court did, whether
the payee could in justice keep the payment, asked whether the payee had the
right to the money. One wonders how a New York court would have
decided the case had it been brought before it.
Why New York courts did not develop positivistic rules as English courts
did is a subject for legal historians to answer. The law of restitution of New
York and other states on this subject must be dealt with in another article.
Meanwhile, the rules of recovery as deduced from English cases in this
article may provide the courts in this country with a source of reference in
deciding cases for recovery of payment made by mistake.
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